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Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ... by cm2187 on Monday November 23, 2015 @03:52AM (#10613494)
The author is being nice calling it a bug. A buffer overflow is a bug. This is a moronic design, like a sql vulnerability. I am shocked that in these days and age, so many web developers have not adopted the mentality "everything coming back from the client may and will ultimately be tainted". Relying on an ID provided by the client without checking the appropriate access is unexcusable. How many years ago was the Dell shopping cart bug (where a client could alter the price of an order)?
Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ... by buro9 on Monday November 23, 2015 @05:20AM (#10613777)
It's frequently scarier than that. I've seen applications do the right thing by IDs and queries, but then attempt to audit access and not correctly escape or sanitise HTTP headers.

Literally, every single piece of information that an application receives is not to be trusted. Even if it's something you think you have set and have full control of (a cookie value), you're wrong... you have no control, and attackers can and will manipulate every field or property to gain a foothold.

Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ... by buro9 on Monday November 23, 2015 @06:08AM (#10613928)
Actually, case in point... X-Forwarded-For. This is not in a spec, people are using it as an unofficial standard. But so long as your edge removes it and then sets it... you're good.

Except Google are doing their page speed optimisation thing in the style of the Opera Mini proxy, but for Chrome users on Android. Google have chosen to populate X-Forwarded-For, so any website that wants to audit the IP address of an end user now has to read this untrusted header.

So devs will realise this, look at the header, stop stripping it at the edge, and start trusting what is essentially a string that anyone can set.

Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ... by xena on Monday November 23, 2015 @11:21AM (#10615408)
I like the way IRC networks handle this, they use a pre-connection protocol verb called WEBIRC (de-facto standard documented here: http://git.io/vBLYp) that also enforces a whitelist of ip address + password combination. This stops most abuse of this feature. Maybe HTTP servers should have something similar.
Re:United Airlines Bug Bounty: An experience in reporting a ... by fabulist on Monday November 23, 2015 @11:54AM (#10615581)
> How many years ago was the Dell shopping cart bug (where a client could alter the price of an order)?

Sounds like every third-party shopping cart I've ever looked at except FoxyCart, and even then this behavior is the default.

(I've heard people refer to this as "that bug shopping carts have." It seems people overwhelmingly prefer catching this with "fraud detection".)