Only if you get an EV certificate, no? My understanding is that the only checks required for getting a normal certificate issued is to verify that the person holding the key that you're signing is in control of the domain. (Verified through methods such as setting particular DNS records, proving control of the email on the WHOIS data, or setting up an HTTP server at a particular DNS address.)
Then again, most sites just use a basic cert, so perhaps DNSSEC provides most of what is needed.
I would hope an EV process would do a better verification, but I've never needed an EV cert, so I don't know.
DNSSEC is sort of like verifying to everyone that you control the DNS, near the time of use, as opposed to just verifying to a CA at time of issuance. Or in other words, if it's OK for a CA to trust DNS, letting everyone else trust it would be good too.
At least the concept is right, 1024-bit rsa keys are kind of scary. And DNSSEC doesn't address confidentiality, but TLS with SNI also leaks hostnames.
A traditional CA validates empirically that a customer controls a domain at some point in time. DNSSEC is a stronger validation of control of the domain, because it's a property of the domain itself.
Trusting the domain registry to indicate who controls a domain makes a lot more sense to me than trusting a third party. If I can't trust the DS records, I can't trust the NS records either.
A DS record doesn't indicate a connection between an organization and a domain though, which a traditional CA supposedly might.