To explain it crudely, yes, it all ultimately reduces to the neuronal substrate and no one in their right mind disagrees. The point is that only looking at this level ignores the important and large set of data that is humans' first-hand observations of consciousness, what you're able to perceive, study, and observe about conscious experience, the kind of observations that Searle makes. To just write off first hand observation data as irrelevant strikes me as anti-scientific if not ideological. I mean, why wouldn't you try to develop a system of consciousness that starts with this data, in tandem with neuronal studies (there's no inherent contradiction)?
Why do you think I'm suggesting any theory of mind at all? You're stating too much.
I'm just suggesting look for patterns and produce models of what you can observe about human subjectivity. Hofstadtr's "strange loop" being an example of one such model.
Well yeah, but the whole problem with subjectivity is that it consists in the mind's model of the environment feeding back into the sensory inferences as inductive bias while the feature data extracted from the sensory inferences also trains the model of the environment.
Which is why people's first-hand "observations" aren't really observations in the scientific sense: "sensings" or "appearances" are actually theory-laden inferences.
Actually, there exists only a data set of one. Since I'm the only one I know is conscious. Joking, but not joking.
I'm just on the side that if something looks and acts like it is conscious, we have to assume it is. But the only being anyone knows is conscious is themselves.
Second, I think the main problem is that most people consider consciousness as something which lies outside of the physical realm, and that there is, supposedly, a one-way communication link from the physical world to our consciousness. However, since we are in fact (physically) talking about the concept of consciousness, this seems highly unlikely. It is thus more likely that consciousness is a part of physics, and we should perhaps treat it as such.