I've got extremely detailed material in my library published within years of the end of WW1 the sorts of detail I honestly never expect to see again.
The long cold war "taught" them to not trust the public, and the global media environment and the Internet only multiply their concerns.
Even if they have reasons to release... Those are increasingly washed away by their fear. We the public grow to accept "infinite secrecy" inch by inch, it's the Overton Window and sadly it works.
A book I just read about the history of the KGB and GRU listed techniques they used to unmask CIA spies. Choice stuff. If the cultural atttache has three assistants, and two of them has offices next to the cultural attache but the third has an office in the maximum-security area, which one is the spy? If that third assistant was hired at the age of 33 to an employer that never hires anyone over 31? And did not go through the regular training? And is listed in the State Department's employee list as "Reserve", ie. not a regular officer? And so on. A long and embarrassing list, and it worked for decades. The CIA knew about it in 1964 (probably not in detail) but the Soviets still used thee techniques to unmask three CIA spies per week in 1980.
Maybe the real stupidity was to locate the spies' offices where they were. But the office lists were published, for decades. The employee list was published, including the "Reserve" marking, for decades.
Decades of experience do not automatically confer competence.
If you're the CIA and you know the Soviets are using this technique, you don't fix the problem, you use it to your advantage by letting the Soviets unmask the identities of lesser spies while not putting your most important spies on the employee list.
I am not even sure if the NSA's mission extends to defending civilians.
At least not fully enough, given the OPM breach.
There hasn't been any significant counterbalance for protecting the public. This is also something of a new threat analysis model for them: software usually fails completely and globally, whereas there's never been an equivalent where someone in Russia figured out something like how to shutdown every GE industrial generator in the world without physical access. If you are used to thinking of the world in the era before pervasive internet connectivity you're going to underestimate the cost of not fixing something.
Nobody has been fired for keeping information secret or using national security as an excuse to mislead the public and even the Congress, and there's been no penalty for using those laws to conceal mistakes or abuse. That speaks of a culture which values secrecy over almost any other concern.
So, yes, they have decades of experience – but I would argue those are decades of experience with the wrong understanding and incentives.
Here's a similar example. The British armed forces have decades and decades of experience of COIN. Yet they were bloody awful at it for most of the recent Iraq and Afghanistan debacles. The fact that someone who had a job fifty years ago and was good at is it meaningless. It only matters if the person who has the job now is good at it.
If you step back and look at terrorism and hacking and traffic fatalities on the same level you can make rational plans to actually help the most people - then assign tasks to the agencies. They certainly can't set their own goals.
So no, I really don't think the NSA has a rational (ie, cost/benefit) balance of attack/defense from our (citizens who want to live long wealthy lives) PoV. It's our job to regulate that.
So, every zero day they find and weaponize, is a zero day that they don't tell the vendor about. So to be able to be aggressive with exploits, they have to leave American computers exposed too, and hope nobody else has found the exploit. So even with the same budget looking for vulnerabilities, doing the right thing for one of their roles makes them worse for the other.
It's a bit like the encryption problem: An encryption system with a backdoor that the NSA has weakens American security too, because the backdoor itself is a valid intelligence target: Infiltrate the NSA, take the backdoor key, and anything the NSA can snoop into, someone else can too.
So doing both defense and offense without major tradeoffs requires having some kind of edge that nobody else can ever have: For instance, the rumored gigantic cluster that can crack specific SSH communications, which they expect nobody else to be able to replicate, just due to the cost of the hardware. That's a far more limited offense than what we know the NSA had at the time of the Snowden leaks.
So my guess, based on public information, is that they do trade-offs, and disclose the issues that they think are easier to find, while keeping around enough ammunition to have something against pretty much every target.
Given the proper motivation (neé, "a carrot-shaped stick"), a potential prospect will be inclined to accept the offer of employment.
Worse, they may even actively do a bad job in the hope of doing damage.
Plus, the whole idea of conscription is absurd.
No, conscription is most assuredly not the answer :)
It is indeed possible that if the NSA used a very different strategy with vulnerabilities, Iran might be further along with its nuclear weapons development.
Or rather, will always be possible until we move to doing protocol and behavior analysis of SCADA commands (as they enter the machine). And that'll just mean it has to get more subtle. If there's a way to do it right, there're more ways to do it wrong.
You're the one trying to shut down discussion.
It's been much neglected in recent decades but the entire country would be better off if the NSA helped patch things. They're hoping some suspected bad guy doesn't get patched but odds are high that many Americans, particularly important IP-heavy businesses, are going to get exploited as well — and given all the reports about how e.g. bin Laden preferred to send messages using trusted couriers, that trade off doesn't seem very good.