Sure. I'll give you this.
> It is almost the case that it's worth pruning out certs from your browser from untrustworthy CAs;
This was my point. So you trust VeriSign, but do you trust the others (there are 125 in my list)?
Here's one:
Issuer: C=TW, O=Government Root Certification Authority
That looks like the Taiwanese government to me. If they have one you don't think that US has one?If you imply that there's a problem with the SSL/TLS/HTTPS model, I'm pushing back hard. There is a weird SSL stigma among web developers, and it's time to start beating it back. The alternatives are worse.
The funny thing is that x509 has the ability to limit signing to various CNs, so it's possible to limit signing powers, but no one seems to do it.
> The alternatives are worse.
Hardly. Some alternatives might be worse (plaintext everywhere, for instance). What I would like to see is a * .example.com signing cert being given to all domain owners when they buy a domain, signed by a single * .com authority (or .net or whatever the domain is). This would prove to the https client that the domain they are connecting to is really the domain owner. This is a basic level of trust that would be an option for everyone who owns a domain (without any stupid yearly charge for the certs).
Banks and other important sites could go above and beyond and buy certs that verify that their business is what they say it is, which is another trust level entirely (this already exists and can be seen when you go to paypal.com in firefox and get the green location bar thing).
I think that would be a much better alternative than our current system.
From another perspective: I worked on the content filter for Parental Controls at Apple. My understanding is that every filtering proxy product with SSL support requires the installation of an insecure certificate. That, or they do a fairly rudimentary IP or reverse-DNS based filtering (which is the route we chose for Parental Controls) for secure connections.
These vendors certainly claim to have a lot of Fortune 500 clients.
It is vanishingly unlikely --- on the level of "major diplomatic incident" --- that China (or any other government, including ours) has the key associated with Verisign's root CA certificate.
It is somewhat more likely (but still, I think, pretty unlikely) that one of the following could have happened:
* Your computer is controlled by an employer that installed a deliberately insecure certificate.
* Your computer is infected with malware that poisons the CA store in your browser.
The first scenario is just very unlikely. We work extensively on-site for Fortune 500 enterprises, in some of the highest-security environments in the world (and in some of the most idiosyncratic and crazy), and none of them require us to install bespoke certificates to access the Internet or their websites. Now, you have to find the one employer (or zero ISPs) that not only installed a custom root, but also gave the keys to China.
The second point is irrelevant. If your computer is infected with malware, there are worse things to be done to you than injecting bogus certificates.
It is almost the case that it's worth pruning out certs from your browser from untrustworthy CAs; unfortunately, the market for certificates has devolved to "who will give us a cert the cheapest". I wouldn't know which ones to kill. A year or so ago, pruning out untrustworthy CAs would have protected you from the MD5 problem.