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Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by onedognight on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @03:22PM (#1051029)
Vanilla browser based https encryption cannot stop states like the US or China which have access to all the major pipes. All it takes to do a man in the middle on basic https is the key for any one certificate that your browser trusts. Any organization that has one (including many employers which install certs) can easily watch your traffic.

HTTPS is fundamentally insecure against MITM attacks by governments.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by tptacek on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @05:29PM (#1051354)
I think the spirit of your comment is pure tinfoil-hat, but the letter of it is actually valid.

It is vanishingly unlikely --- on the level of "major diplomatic incident" --- that China (or any other government, including ours) has the key associated with Verisign's root CA certificate.

It is somewhat more likely (but still, I think, pretty unlikely) that one of the following could have happened:

* Your computer is controlled by an employer that installed a deliberately insecure certificate.

* Your computer is infected with malware that poisons the CA store in your browser.

The first scenario is just very unlikely. We work extensively on-site for Fortune 500 enterprises, in some of the highest-security environments in the world (and in some of the most idiosyncratic and crazy), and none of them require us to install bespoke certificates to access the Internet or their websites. Now, you have to find the one employer (or zero ISPs) that not only installed a custom root, but also gave the keys to China.

The second point is irrelevant. If your computer is infected with malware, there are worse things to be done to you than injecting bogus certificates.

It is almost the case that it's worth pruning out certs from your browser from untrustworthy CAs; unfortunately, the market for certificates has devolved to "who will give us a cert the cheapest". I wouldn't know which ones to kill. A year or so ago, pruning out untrustworthy CAs would have protected you from the MD5 problem.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by onedognight on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @06:54PM (#1051541)
> It is vanishingly unlikely [...] China [...] has the key associated with Verisign's root CA certificate.

Sure. I'll give you this.

> It is almost the case that it's worth pruning out certs from your browser from untrustworthy CAs;

This was my point. So you trust VeriSign, but do you trust the others (there are 125 in my list)?

Here's one:

     Issuer: C=TW, O=Government Root Certification Authority
That looks like the Taiwanese government to me. If they have one you don't think that US has one?
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by tptacek on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @07:29PM (#1051599)
If you suggest "now is the time to get paranoid about your certificate store", I agree.

If you imply that there's a problem with the SSL/TLS/HTTPS model, I'm pushing back hard. There is a weird SSL stigma among web developers, and it's time to start beating it back. The alternatives are worse.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by __david__ on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @08:20PM (#1051680)
It's more a problem of certificate chain trust models. You have to trust the security of every podunk CA in your browser's root store since they all have the ability to sign anyone in the world's cert. Should the government CA of Taiwan have the ability to sign bofa.com? I would say no. Let them have * .tw.

The funny thing is that x509 has the ability to limit signing to various CNs, so it's possible to limit signing powers, but no one seems to do it.

> The alternatives are worse.

Hardly. Some alternatives might be worse (plaintext everywhere, for instance). What I would like to see is a * .example.com signing cert being given to all domain owners when they buy a domain, signed by a single * .com authority (or .net or whatever the domain is). This would prove to the https client that the domain they are connecting to is really the domain owner. This is a basic level of trust that would be an option for everyone who owns a domain (without any stupid yearly charge for the certs).

Banks and other important sites could go above and beyond and buy certs that verify that their business is what they say it is, which is another trust level entirely (this already exists and can be seen when you go to paypal.com in firefox and get the green location bar thing).

I think that would be a much better alternative than our current system.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by tptacek on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @08:44PM (#1051717)
I agree with you completely. By alternatives, I meant wholesale replacements to SSL/TLS.
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by wooster on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @06:46PM (#1051522)
"The first scenario is just very unlikely."

From another perspective: I worked on the content filter for Parental Controls at Apple. My understanding is that every filtering proxy product with SSL support requires the installation of an insecure certificate. That, or they do a fairly rudimentary IP or reverse-DNS based filtering (which is the route we chose for Parental Controls) for secure connections.

These vendors certainly claim to have a lot of Fortune 500 clients.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by tptacek on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @06:58PM (#1051550)
You're thinking of, e.g. Bluecoat. Certainly everyone runs something like a Bluecoat. But I can't name a client that uses the feature where your end users install the Bluecoat cert so they can scrub SSL traffic. They just use IP and DNS blacklists, like you.
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by run4yourlives on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @06:33PM (#1051492)
It's a lot easier just to install a hidden keylogger then it is to fart around with certs and try to crack https.

Google even references this in the press releases - most of the information gained was done through phishing.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by Retric on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @04:28PM (#1051199)
A MITM attack of this nature would be easy for a website owner to discover. Just compare the public keys with what a random browser is receiving.

Edit: CA operates based on trust. All it takes is for a single website to demonstrate this is going on for it to quickly become public knowledge. Now, if you where to target a specific user it might be possible to do this, but hacking their system is a much simpler approach to the same problem with more benefits.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by onedognight on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @04:34PM (#1051214)
Not in the long run since any HTML/JS code you send at that point is vulnerable as well.
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by adamsmith on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @04:26PM (#1051195)
Hm. I wonder how often this happens. We should be able to detect it easily if they do it all the time. Today they don't have to.

For the long term I wonder if it's possible to close this hole by putting certs into DNS and using a single key to sign all of these DNS records. Is this part of the DNSSEC spec? (not at a computer and can't remember for sure if it is called DNSSEC; whatever the name of the next gen DNS is.)

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by tptacek on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @05:35PM (#1051364)
The original intent of DNSSEC was to provide an IETF-endorsed public key infrastructure, not to defend the DNS from attacks. The idea was, "we have this great DNS protocol, it works well at Internet-scale, let's leverage it for something other than hostname resolution".

The reality of DNSSEC is that it's creaky, somewhat broken, solves neither the PKI nor the DNS protection problem well, and --- because it is likely to pervasively screw up applications across the Internet --- unlikely ever to be deployed.

Either way, there's no magic bullet. If you concede root keys to China, you have to concede DNSSEC keys --- which are, if anything, more loosely held and more widely distributed than CA keys, which have never had a known breach.

Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by ronnier on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @03:57PM (#1051118)
While I was in China, I remoted back to my home computer through a remote desktop session to check email. I also tunneled my RDP session through an SSH proxy. Hopefully that was secure enough. I also changed my passwords once I returned home.
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by onedognight on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @04:29PM (#1051201)
Once you have the host key for the site you are connecting to on your laptop SSH is not vulnerable to a MITM attack in the same way that browsers are with their huge CA list. Of course, pay attention to the warnings about changed host keys.
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by swolchok on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @05:14PM (#1051317)
Patently false. If users submit to the login URL through a link that was sent in the clear, a MITM can just run sslstrip (http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/) and presto, you're visiting the HTTP version of the page instead of HTTPS. The login URL needs to be unavailable over HTTP, as does the login form.
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by wooster on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @06:48PM (#1051527)
Wrong parent post? SSL != SSH
Re:7 Major Sites that Send Passwords Unprotected, & China's ... by swolchok on Wednesday January 13, 2010 @07:42PM (#1051621)
You're right, I misread SSH as SSL.