This is a bad way of doing things. That means as soon as someone finds a way to get inside the network, the bank is wrecked. You need to look at security from the point of assuming the attacker somehow got inside because it'll happen one day.
http://digg.com/2015/ashley-madison-hack
""" MOTHERBOARD: How did you hack Avid Life Media? Was it hard?
The Impact Team: We worked hard to make fully undetectable attack, then got in and found nothing to bypass.
MOTHERBOARD: What was their security like?
The Impact Team: Bad. Nobody was watching. No security. Only thing was segmented network. You could use Pass1234 from the internet to VPN to root on all servers. """
This most definitely is not the view taken at the financial companies I've worked in/with including a number of banks.
They take internal security very seriously. There's the obvious threat of some form of break-in (no-one I know seriously believes that an unbreachable connected system is buildable). But there's also the issues of insiders taking stuff, Chinese walls and regulatory restrictions on access. It simply doesn't make economic sense to take security lightly any more.
And debuggable? Not crashing in random places due to stack or heap corruption helps there.
"Because that's where all the exploitable attack vectors in unsafe code are."
Whilst obviously Internet facing apps are treated with more caution, it's definitely not true in my experience to state that there are no security demands on internal applications. I would expect that most/all banks these days realise that there's no such thing as a fully trusted network...
Not everyone has security as a requirement. Some people jsut want to write something that is both fast, predicable. Most banks don't make any security demands of internal applications because they are not accessible to the internet. At which point safety is just a way to slow you do.