4th person: These people are starving. I could help them by doing as much as I can afford. Hovewer, most people seem to unconsciously subscribe to CIE, and they will see that as too little help, therefore I'll become an object of hate in the media. It may ruin my business. I'll be pointed at on the street as a bad person. Therefore, I shall ignore the starving people. We have all those social programs that help them, I pay taxes, so it's all cool, right?
If people's thought process was as you portray it, people wouldn't get involved at all or very few would. But the fact that we have so many businesses merely paying these people as LESS as they can (2), proves that the concern of (4) is doesn't exist, or, at least, doesn't deter them.
They do go into business in those areas and they do pay as little as they can get away with -- people's criticism and "hate in the media" be damned.
Besides, if the people portrayed in (4) REALLY wanted to "help them by doing as much as they could afford", then they would be (1).
Copenhagen says (3) is better than (2). The author thinks (2) is better than (3).
(3) doesn't concern a business or a relation between you and those people. It's a total lack of interaction. We always have that, for 99.9999999 of the population of the planet.
Now, when it comes to business, a few do (1). A whole lot businessmen do (2).
The Copenhangen strawman wants us to think that it's either (2) or (3) -- as if (1) is impossible.
(a) The Copenhagen interpretation of ethics, the idea (roughly stated) that people who interact with a problem are more responsible than people who ignore it
(b) The factual question of whether some people subscribe to CIE (or perhaps deny it, but act as though they subscribe to it)
(c) The normative question of whether CIE is "correct".
(d) Factual questions about which of (1), (2) and (3) funge off against each other under which situations
You seem to be making some claims about (d) and then saying (b) is false and (a) is a strawman, but that doesn't follow.
You're saying pretty explicitly that people who do (3) are okay, possibly conditional on not having interacted with starving people; and people who do (2) are bad. If that's not what you think, please say so. If it is, then the thing you're calling a straw man is something you actually subscribe to.
If you think it's relevant, that there's no business relation, then that is pretty much exactly what CIE is. And fine, go ahead and argue, as others in the thread have done, for (c). Argue that yes, it's important that there's no business relation, and that (3) is better than (2).
But right now you're coming across kind of like:
"Stavrians think it's unethical to floom in your garglies."
"That's a strawman. Of course it's unethical to floom in your garglies."
and it's pretty frustrating.
Things like pure charity, selectively helping some people, etc are all fine and few would argue against them. The negative "CIE" reactions the article cites are far from representative of the most common reactions to these things -- they're mostly some media wanting to make a big deal out of a non-story.
The whole CIE point of view (interaction vs non-interaction) etc confuses things when it comes (as in some examples given) to interactions like employment, etc.
I'd put it as simply as that: If you're the boss of someone, it's NOT OK to be a shitty boss, just because you're "still better than someone not paying them".
That's the argument I see anti-CIE people make ("I can be as bad as I like, as long as the net outcome of my actions to the other is positive"), and I find it morally abhorent.
Yes, you might be more helpful to them than someone not paying them, but you're still a scum for being a shitty boss. Especially if you're being purposefully shitty boss especially because your employee is in need and can't avoid working for you (i.e. scarcity of jobs in the area, he has a criminal record, etc).
This sleight of hand (expanding the subject of good vs bad behavior to non-interaction) mainly serves to divert the responsibility one has to people who interacts with to the general population.
This can be handy for things like the defense of sweatshop child labour: "Hey, I might have kids working for $1/day and make myself a cool $50 million a year from their work, but at least I pay them $1/day. What have you done for them?".
To the most abhorent deals made with desperate people: "I will put a word in with the dictator and save your husband from execution if you let me have sex with your daughter". (Hey, at least the guy saved her husband. What did you do? Besides the daughter begrudgingly agreed to it).
Regarding your other comment:
>You're saying pretty explicitly that people who do (3) are okay, possibly conditional on not having interacted with starving people; and people who do (2) are bad. If that's not what you think, please say so. If it is, then the thing you're calling a straw man is something you actually subscribe to.
Nope, I subscribe to its superset, that includes (1) instead of pretending its all a XOR between (2) and (3), and this (2) is the better option. (1) is the better option. CEI is a strawman because it lacks subtetly and hides the all important (1) alternative.
(2) can be bad independently of what (3) does or doesn't do.
A shitty (abusing, sexist, micro-managing, crappy paying, credit-taking) boss (2) is still a shitty boss, despite the fact that he pays your salary and a random person on the street (3) doesn't.
Yeah, you're better off with a shitty boss than with no boss, because else you'd starve if it was to (3). That doesn't make (3) bad, and it doesn't make your boss any LESS shitty.
Ethics is not just about outcome, it's also, and perhaps mainly, about intent. Which in the long term matters more than outcomes, because it helps shape the future, change policy, etc.
With "utilitarian ethics" we'd still have child labor in the US. And no "safety laws" either, because it's better to be employeed with risks than to force the employer to pay for safety measures and reduce his hiring capacity leading to unemployment. But it turns out if you don't think in "marginal" terms, you can have safety measures and no child labor, and still have a vibrant economy, simply by regulating those options out of the question. Utilitarian ethic proponents more often than not advise us to keep those practices because they're "better than nothing".
The world might be marginally better off by people "paying wages while being shitty bosses", but it's far better by people actually and actively being good bosses.
And by encouraging or praising the first type of behavior we discourage the second. That's what this "CIE" thing is about, seen in it's non strawman form, -- not about the superior morality of not being involved, who nobody really argues for.
No one is pretending this. At least, I'm not, and the author of the article isn't.
You're completely missing the fact that I'm not talking about ethics here. You're arguing pro-CIE, and your arguments are fine, but trying to argue ethics is beside the point. I'm talking about ethical positions, a meta-level up; and I'm saying that you subscribe to CIE while calling CIE a straw man.
I can't see how this can be, since the core of what we are discussing is a supposed "Copenhagen interpretation of ETHICS".
>I'm talking about ethical positions, a meta-level up; and I'm saying that you subscribe to CIE while calling CIE a straw man.
Again, no logical contradiction there.
As I explained I subscribe to CIE+ (a superset).
This means that I can both subscribe to CIE (as it's contained in the superset CIE+) AND find it when discussed alone (without the extra additions) lacking/a strawman.
For a crude example of that, one can logically subscribe to S+ ("men are rapists sometimes") and still view S ("men are rapists") as a strawman.
Talking about ethical positions: some people say this is good and this is bad; other people say...
I still think that what you call a strawman is just something you actually believe, and that you're interpreting it as a much stronger claim than it actually is. But I don't care enough to argue further.
Recognizing that disincentivising marginal improvements in behavior leads to a worse behavior is not claiming only those two behaviors exist. It's just saying that perverse incentives lead to worse outcomes.
Isn't that begging the question? Who proved that it "results in worse behavior"?
I wouldn't have thought of it as begging the question, because it didn't occur to me that the empirical question of what the results are was in dispute! Yes, I suppose if you believe that this sort of Copenhagen-based complaining actually consistently leads people to do (1) rather than (2), rather than mostly resulting in (4), there would be little reason to have a problem with it. As it is, I'm not prepared to argue that empirical question right now, so I'm just going to note that I disagree and and that there's any number of examples of (4) out there.
1st person: These people are starving. I will treat them as I would a non-starving person, say pay them $xx/hour which I calculated is enough to build a profitable business.
2nd person: These people are starving. I will pay them the least I can get away with it, after all it's not like they have many options. Sure, I could make a profit even if I paid them 10 times that, but why go there? Fuck them, they should be grateful that they get anything instead of nothing at all.
For me, the 2nd person is a jerk. I wouldn't want them anywhere near my society. Scum of the earth.
And the whole "Copehangen" theory BS wants us to believe that it's either (2) or nothing -- that paying people in need the lower you can (near substinence) is the only thing possible.
There are several shades between (1) and (2), but most proponents of such ideas go for the full-on (2), and then pretend they are some kind of benefactors too.