I don't appeal to any such BS. The so called "Copenhagen theory of ethics" is an ill-thought neologism of the writer of the blog post, and lacks several metric tons of nuances and considerations.
The basic premise -- that a third-party has the same "moral obligation" to pay her maternity leave as the person who employeed her, made money of her (the total balanace was positive on THEIR side, not hers) and fired her when she become pregnant, is absurd.
Not only that, but protections against firing an employee that became pregnant are an accepted part of the legal and moral obligations of an employee, enforced by law in most developed countries.
If anything the burden of proof is on the author of TFA to counter the thinking of all those legislators.
I would also like to know how a deal like "I'll give you food everyday for having sex with you" to a poor woman who hates the idea, but is starving and thus accepts it, is any different than the situations lauded by the author of TFA article.
After all the woman is better off, right? She would be starving or even dead from hunger. And she accepted the deal by her own volition.
"The Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics says that when you observe or interact with a problem in any way, you can be blamed for it. At the very least, you are to blame for not doing more."
To summarize your post: I subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation of ethics, but don't call it that!
I have no moral objection to prostitution. I also have no moral objection to "I'll give you money everyday for cleaning my house" to a poor person who hates cleaning.
Do you have moral objections to anything, then, or do you think that as the necessary money have been exchanged everything is OK?
Also do you think that "voluntary agreement" means the same for everybody in every financial situation?
Also, I think it's best to pick a different example than prostitution because of the importance of cultural factors there. Instead, what if I offer $20 to a poor person to let me slap them hard in the face? That might be a good deal for them, but I'm still a jerk for doing it. The problem though isn't that the transaction is exploitative. It's that it's wasteful. Why did the poor person need to endure the slap? What was the point?
Transactions are never arbitrary. They're an action taken by individuals based on their interests, and their interests are determined by their values, and their values are often shaped -- at least to some degree -- by communal values.
> but this basic price determination mechanism is great when it works
How do you know when it works? Obviously, there is difference of opinion in determining what "works" means.
> Instead, what if I offer $20 to a poor person to let me slap them hard in the face? That might be a good deal for them, but I'm still a jerk for doing it. The problem though isn't that the transaction is exploitative. It's that it's wasteful.
OK, that's a classic.
It was positive on both of their sides. They made money from the fruits of her labor, and she made money from the money that they gave her in exchange.
Employment is positive sum. Just because one party benefits from a transaction, doesn't mean someone else lost out.
Obviously improving things even a little is better than not improving them at all. People just disagree whether what the author sees as a clear improvement is in fact so -- that's why you and the GP disagree.
Also, a nuanced ethical view may support a an action that improves things while at the same time note (and accept as the lesser evil) an ethical problem with it. No one says that any desired (or "good") action must be ethically perfect. Even moralists know how to compromise sometimes, even though they do so with protest. Seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to me.
> Since I'm more utilitarian and I don't take Copenhagen as my moral axiom
You and the article's author seem to subscribe to what ethicists call the "non-worseness claim". I found a discussion of this claim here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/#4
That's by definition the Copenhagen interpretation of ethics.
If you want to make a different argument that does not depend on the Copenhagen interpretation, go for it. The fact that you can make a different argument doesn't mean that others (e.g. coldtea) aren't using Copenhagen.
The author states his definition as "the Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics says that when you observe or interact with a problem in any way, you can be blamed for it." No one subscribes to that ethics, hence it's not a thing (anywhere outside's the author's distorted view of others, that is).
OTOH, saying that the level of your responsibility for another individual may correlate with the benefit they give you (e.g. you make a profit) seems like a reasonable thing. It seems quite reasonable to believe that our responsibility towards the other may increase if 1/ we somehow contributed to their misfortune, 2/ if we somehow benefit from it, or 3/ if we benefit from them in any way at all. Each of these may of course increase the responsibility by different amounts.
Points 2 and 3 seem like a natural conclusion of the ideal of fairness and reciprocity. Your contribution to the good of others should be commensurate with their contribution to yours.
> Coldtea explicitly said he's not responsible for the pregnant woman "because I'm not making money off of her", implying that if he were to observe/interact with her he would be responsible.
No, that's what you explicitly said when you tried hard to not understand other people's arguments. coldtea said no such thing. coldtea said that they wouldn't pay for the woman's maternity leave, not that their responsibility towards her is nil. coldtea's level of responsibility simply does not reach the point of owing her maternity leave.
Coldtea: "Only, one of us [the employer] has used the $x an hour work of that woman up to that point..."
If you want to argue that coldtea isn't making a moral argument as to why he isn't responsible, be my guest. I don't think my interpretation is unreasonable.
It seems quite reasonable to believe that our responsibility towards the other may increase if 1/ we somehow contributed to their misfortune, 2/ if we somehow benefit from it, or 3/ if we benefit from them in any way at all.
(2) and (3) are exactly what the author is calling the Copenhagen Interpretation. I thought this wasn't a thing?
That is not the case. Let me state it clearly. He says:
interaction => blame
We say: profit => increased responsibility
No one blames the interactor for the origin of the problem, nor does anyone demand increased responsibility if the interactor doesn't benefit from the interaction in any way. No one even asks for a level of responsibility that far exceeds the benefit.The author's view is known as the non-worseness claim, which is often described by those who are more generous towards it as "free floating evil". Those who are less generous, view it in worse ways, of course.
BTW, the criticism of homeless experiment does seem stupid, but I don't know the details. Also, the critic may not have actually made a moral argument (even if he tried to frame it as such). For all I know he's a politician who opposes the mayor and would use any argument at all against him, even if he doesn't really believe it.
But you're just rewording it with synonyms in hopes of avoiding the application of the Copenhagen Interpretation to your/coldtea's post.
"interaction" == "profit"
... because the blog author was already talking about "interaction" in terms of monetary benefits. "blame" == "increased responsibility"
... because the author already wrote "At the very least, you are to blame for not doing more." and "doing more" is what increased responsibility is.Whether we use other synonyms such as "profit", "economic gains", "saving time", "outsourcing tedious work", etc, it doesn't matter.
Likewise, using synonyms such as "blame", "responsibility", "burden", "cross to bear", "moral debt", etc, doesn't change the interpretation.
Not true: in all the examples given, the critics never articlulate a mechanism for how that could be true. I know because I look for this every time such a scenario comes up.
You seem to be making the mistake of thinking that "because a good argument exists, that must be what these critics really mean"; that because there's academic literature on optimal tariffs, that's what's grounding the protectionists who complain about "takin' our jobs". But the people referred to in the post don't articulate how eg Uber surge pricing made things worse, only that "hey they're visible and related to suffering". If and when people cite how Uber surge pricing reduces service, Uber supporters are more than willing to have that discussion!
If the argument only exists in a philosophical article that almost none of the critics have heard of, you can't really say that's driving their critique.
Yet the author chooses to present the situation as a group of people who want nothing other than to make the world a better place, while stupid hordes get in their way. I can assure you that that's not the true state of affairs, either.
Moreover, why is it good to assume that those who disagree with you do so because they're stupid? Maybe they're not, and maybe they accidentally made a good argument. In any case, trying to understand the merits of the arguments would only enrich you. But the author -- who clearly considers himself to be among the smart ones -- never bothers to look up the literature on this very topic (or, at least, he doesn't cite any), namely mutually advantageous exploitation, opting instead to base it on a much simpler philosophical argument, without consideration for the nuanced discussion of this very issue. So we can assume -- as he and you do -- that his position is driven by nothing more than simplistic arguments.
I want to defend the general point though, that "If people are making a general class of error in some context, then that class should be pointed out, even if not everyone in that context makes that error." You're right: some people do go far enough to (dubiously) make a case about how eg surge pricing reduces availability. These arguments are the exception, not the norm, and people should be made aware of the more general, mistaken point.
And for what it's worth, I most certainly do try to find these "they're making it strictly worse than had they not intervened" arguments, but the popular expositions never make them. The fact that "oh, someone else makes arguments somewhere that aren't crappy" is no defense, and it does not improve the debate to let bad arguments linger because you prefer they be equated with better ones (which really just confuses things). If someone makes an error, that error should be corrected, whether or not there's an argument for the same conclusion that doesn't.
You really don't have to go far to find a protectionist argument that's 100% "dey took are jerbs" and 0% "this is not the optimal tariff defined in the literature."
But the author is not making any good arguments in favor of mutually advantageous exploitation either, and there are good ones. He is also guilty of making naive arguments! This very topic has been debated at length by philosophers. Why reduce it to ridiculing the other side while not showing any clear, educated thought on the author's part, either?
> You really don't have to go far to find a protectionist argument that's 100% "dey took are jerbs"
And you really don't have to go far to find arguments like, "we're da job craters!" and "we're making the world a better place, woooo!" (which is the level of arguments the author is making)
People are saying that mutually advantageous exploitation is at least problematic and requires more thoughtfulness. Some, of course, may disagree, but this is a long-standing and interesting debate among philosophers. So, instead of feeling self-righteously and victimised he should 1/ examine reality more closely because perhaps things are not as they appear to him, and 2/ try to understand some of the good arguments against MAE.
That is not at all obvious. It's particularly not obvious when you benefit from the marginal improvement, thereby creating a damn good reason to not improve the problem any more than marginally.
Ok, you are pretty explicitly appealing to the Copenhagen theory of ethics. Good to have that out in the open.
Since I'm more utilitarian and I don't take Copenhagen as my moral axiom, we'll obviously disagree. Now we understand why.