Re:How Chromium Works
by nickpsecurity on Saturday September 26, 2015 @08:35PM
(#10284956)
Sorry to hear that. Yeah, they're not as strong for C++ yet as it's more complex and has less R&D in that sector. My idea for C++ would be to try to find or even encourage development of those that catch the interface and concurrency errors at the least. So, that's Design-by-Contract [1] [2] along with something like ConSeq [3] if it's available or usable for your build. D-by-C, done right, gets a lot of mileage w/ ConSeq showing promise.
Do keep the exploit mitigation tech, though. The NaCl paper was one of best reads I had that year. Most interesting one right now is Code Pointer Integrity [4]. Curious, is there a configuration that swaps out the sandbox for something with the same interface but no real sandbox? Point is if we can swap out the existing sandbox (esp CFI) for a different technology (eg CPI, Softbound + CETS).
[1] http://www.drdobbs.com/an-exception-or-a-bug/184401686
[2] http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/8293/Design-by-Contract-...
[3] https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WZAQPu...
[4] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi14/osdi14...
Instead, we've focused pretty heavily on more conventional anti-exploit mitigations applied to existing C++ code. Our sandboxing is the most obvious one, but we have a variety of other protections on top of typical stuff like ASLR and NX (e.g. heap partitioning, a safe integer handling toolkit, etc). We're also leading efficient control-flow integrity work in clang, and busily working it up to a stable release. And then we have fuzzing as part of our continuous integration, running across thousands of cores of instrumented builds.