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Re:How Chromium Works by nickpsecurity on Friday September 25, 2015 @08:18PM (#10281517)
Does Google currently use or plan to use static analysis tools that prove absence of key bug classes?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_...

I know in safety-critical the Astree and SPARK tools have been particularly good at verifying code. Something like Polyspace might be more appropriate for Chrome, though.

Re:How Chromium Works by justinschuh on Saturday September 26, 2015 @01:01AM (#10282160)
We've invested quite a bit of energy in static analysis tools over the years, but so far the return hasn't been there. There are still ongoing efforts, and we'll see if those pan out, but up to this point we've just run into a very low hit rate and a false positive rate that drowns everything else out from a security perspective. Formal methods are a different question, but I can't imagine the size of the undertaking needed to convert even a subset of Chromium over to formal methods.

Instead, we've focused pretty heavily on more conventional anti-exploit mitigations applied to existing C++ code. Our sandboxing is the most obvious one, but we have a variety of other protections on top of typical stuff like ASLR and NX (e.g. heap partitioning, a safe integer handling toolkit, etc). We're also leading efficient control-flow integrity work in clang, and busily working it up to a stable release. And then we have fuzzing as part of our continuous integration, running across thousands of cores of instrumented builds.

Re:How Chromium Works by nickpsecurity on Saturday September 26, 2015 @08:35PM (#10284956)
Sorry to hear that. Yeah, they're not as strong for C++ yet as it's more complex and has less R&D in that sector. My idea for C++ would be to try to find or even encourage development of those that catch the interface and concurrency errors at the least. So, that's Design-by-Contract [1] [2] along with something like ConSeq [3] if it's available or usable for your build. D-by-C, done right, gets a lot of mileage w/ ConSeq showing promise.

Do keep the exploit mitigation tech, though. The NaCl paper was one of best reads I had that year. Most interesting one right now is Code Pointer Integrity [4]. Curious, is there a configuration that swaps out the sandbox for something with the same interface but no real sandbox? Point is if we can swap out the existing sandbox (esp CFI) for a different technology (eg CPI, Softbound + CETS).

[1] http://www.drdobbs.com/an-exception-or-a-bug/184401686

[2] http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/8293/Design-by-Contract-...

[3] https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WZAQPu...

[4] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi14/osdi14...

Re:How Chromium Works by wolfgke on Friday September 25, 2015 @08:24PM (#10281533)
SPARK is based on Ada. Astree also seems to be limited only to C. Chrome, to the opposite, is written in millions of lines of C++.
Re:How Chromium Works by nickpsecurity on Friday September 25, 2015 @08:31PM (#10281556)
The reason I mentioned SPARK and Astree is because they're excellent at what they do. People Googling them will understand how these approaches work to prove absence of bugs rather than test for their presence. Then, they might experiment with some of the others on the list.

I mentioned PolySpace as an example of something more appropriate for Chrome because it supports C++ and is used in high integrity applications.