Instead, we've focused pretty heavily on more conventional anti-exploit mitigations applied to existing C++ code. Our sandboxing is the most obvious one, but we have a variety of other protections on top of typical stuff like ASLR and NX (e.g. heap partitioning, a safe integer handling toolkit, etc). We're also leading efficient control-flow integrity work in clang, and busily working it up to a stable release. And then we have fuzzing as part of our continuous integration, running across thousands of cores of instrumented builds.
Do keep the exploit mitigation tech, though. The NaCl paper was one of best reads I had that year. Most interesting one right now is Code Pointer Integrity [4]. Curious, is there a configuration that swaps out the sandbox for something with the same interface but no real sandbox? Point is if we can swap out the existing sandbox (esp CFI) for a different technology (eg CPI, Softbound + CETS).
[1] http://www.drdobbs.com/an-exception-or-a-bug/184401686
[2] http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/8293/Design-by-Contract-...
[3] https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WZAQPu...
[4] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi14/osdi14...
I mentioned PolySpace as an example of something more appropriate for Chrome because it supports C++ and is used in high integrity applications.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_...
I know in safety-critical the Astree and SPARK tools have been particularly good at verifying code. Something like Polyspace might be more appropriate for Chrome, though.