I also thought it was odd he always seemed to have no problem catching US nation state malware, but all of those Russian state cyber weapons other companies keep finding seem to allude him and his team.
Coincidence?
Kaspersky blog has written up analyses of malware campaigns from many different countries. Here are some Russian-origin APT campaigns.
1. https://blog.kaspersky.com/turla-apt-exploiting-satellites/9...
2. https://securelist.com/blog/research/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/
3. http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2014/crouching-yet...
Brian Krebs also writes about popular malware that first does a check to see if its being run on a computer in Russia. If so, it stops running. There's a lot of government sponsored malware coming from Russia. There's a public private partnership to put profitable malware on non-Russian computers and Russian officials turn a blind eye due to corruption, bribes, etc. Its all fairly ugly.
On a cyber weapons level, who knows, but citing things like TTP which releases to FOSS or Israel's defense industry as a sign of corruption is asinine and not remotely comparable to what is the status quo in Russia. Cyber weapons will always be here and, when used correctly, can't be detected by signature based AV because they have no idea what to look for and the exploits they use are typically zero days. Stuxnet used, I believe, 3 or 4 different zero day attacks.
Nor did you bother to read the Kaspersky articles where the proof is laid out in a pretty obvious way. I think its foolish to knee-jerk to "Oh Russia does this, so must everyone else." Certainly there are degrees of corruption, and Russia is on the extreme end of this scale. Brian Krebs and Tavis Ormandy aren't on some NSA payroll to make Russia look bad. Russians do that for free. Lets stop playing the "every government is the same" card. Its been historically untrue.
>Every security vendor is aligned with it's "host" nation
Also, I really doubt the guys writing rules for Snort, ClamAV, or mod_security or OSSEC are aligned with anyone. Your view is incredibly cynical and very much an example of the disingenious tactic of "whataboutism" Russians use to defend their wrongdoings. Those rules are public, pray tell, which ones are NSA backdoors? I suggest you come up with some proof if you're making such accusations. The articles I linked to about Kasperky are significant and well-researched.
edit: I cant reply below so I'll type it here. Clinton-era crypto limitations are a non-issue. Clinton lost the crypto wars after the Clipper chip was never passed or funded and after Phil Zimmerman wrote PGP and helped end crypto restrictions. I'm talking about things happening right now. 20+ years ago whining is not helping nor relevant. Use whatever crypto you like.
Symantec did a very extensive study on Stuxnet they were the ones that confirmed that it was intended to damage the centrifuges by fooling the industrial motor controllers.
What is more likely is that a national intelligence organization will use the local security vendors for counter intelligence purposes i.e. tipping them to suspected cyber intelligence operations that they've identified through other means.
This is a much more likely scenario than simply telling them not to talk about certain malware, it's easier to enforce and it provides them with both deniability and a more favorable outcome.
Geopolitics also play an important role here, different vendors have different market share in different regions. Kaspersky for example is more common in lower income countries, as well as countries that are under direct US sanctions like Syria or Iran, or countries to which US companies will have hard time exporting too or developing their market due to past relations.
So when you have a virus that infects many machines in Iran or Syria it's if any of the computers will be running fully licensed and supported commercial anti-virus software it wont be Symantec or McAfee that they'll be running but rather Kaspersky or any other non-US/Western software.
An average antivirus software has everything necessary already. Personal licenses as a way to identify the specific machine or person, automatic streaming software updates as a way to deliver the payload and almost unrestricted privileges on the target system enough to infiltrate and stay concealed.
As an example, there's still room for argument about the Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm, and RSA making that the default PRNG for some or all of their products. RSA denies taking money for it. Nobody can make an airtight case for the NSA deliberately weakening it. Yet we still all kind of view Dual_EC_DRBG with suspicion.
Not that RSA hasn't done so in the past, but it was public when encryption software could not be exported RSA cam to an agreement with the US government to export it's 64bit encryption, it would use a 40bit private key and append the message with an additional 24bits which are transmitted in clear text and complete the private key to it's 64bit size.
This was a government mandated "work reducer" so the NSA if need be could decrypt the message as they had the ability to break 40bit encryption and the rest of the 24 bit of the 64bit encryption key was known for each message. This wasn't hidden, this was even released in a conference with great pride that RSA could now export it's mail encryption suit to Europe. Germany made a fuss about this 5 years after the fact, but everyone pointed and said well they announced it in a conference.
It's strange to think that corporate employees would be that much harder to corrupt, especially for their own country.
1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Hanssen 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Trofimoff
Human assets is a different story, 1.4 and even 250K while not being a large sum is quite a large amount of money. Those assets are usually developed by other means, in most cases the money is largely irrelevant even if the asset refuses to take money tradecraft mandates that they'll be forced to take it it just to leave a money trail that they could then be threatened with if they no longer with to comply. Additionally being paid also makes the asset more invested in their duty because it creates a link like with a would be employer, and allows them to quantify their assignment with a positive reinforcement no matter how big or small it is. So money which is paid to long term assets isn't really a bribe, an initial sum might be used to turn the asset in the first place but it also usually require them to be in a position to need it e.g. gambling debts, medical bills etc. Generally assets that can be bribed will not be farmed in such manner as the cases you've mentioned, people that can be easily bribed cannot be trusted which isn't a trait you want in an asset.
Even without that - it's free money for a benign reason, while doing the security services a favour. "Hey we've got this new crypto thing that's amazing but people don't believe us. Add it to your product, and we'll give you token compensation. Also we'll also make a note of what great guys you are."
I know of employees busted for internal schemes they cooked up (it was pretty cool working with BigCorp to setup an international sting to get them). It simply cannot be that hard to find people that need or want money and get them to compromise things for relatively small amounts of money.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-19/cybersecur...
http://www.wired.com/2012/07/ff_kaspersky/
You'd be a little crazy to run this outside of Russia. I suspect there are more backdoors disguised as "vulnerabilities we knew nothing about, totally, its news to us!" This reads like a trivial overflow which would have been found with some basic testing. This is a common ploy with untrustworthy software.
Maybe Kaspersky was safe to run once, but with Russia's new brazen anti-West attitude, its a liability now.