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Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by msm23 on Monday August 31, 2015 @11:15PM (#10150523)
I prefer to trust the NSA on these matters. They end up saying much of what the author has written, but they make it clear why you want to use one vs the other.

The excerpt below is from https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/I43V_Slick_Sheets/S... (which in turn also references https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/I43V_Slick_Sheets/S... )

Unix-like Platforms (e.g. Linux, Android, and Mac OS X):

Application developers should use the fread function to read random bytes from /dev/random for cryptographic RNG services. Because /dev/random is a blocking device, /dev/random may cause unacceptable delays, in which case application developers may prefer to implement a DRBG using /dev/random as a conditioned seed.

Application developers should use the “Random Number Generators: Introduction for Operating System Developers” guidance in developing this solution. If /dev/random still produces unacceptable delays, developers should use /dev/urandom which is a non-blocking device, but only with a number of additional assurances:

- The entropy pool used by /dev/urandom must be saved between reboots. - The Linux operating system must have estimated that the entropy pool contained the appropriate security strength entropy at some point before calling /dev/urandom. The current pool estimate can be read from /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail.

At most 2^80 bytes may be read from /dev/urandom before the developer must ensure that new entropy was added to the pool.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by wfleming on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @12:01AM (#10150655)
Maybe I'm just tired & not able to detect sarcasm right now, but isn't 2^80 bytes more bytes than are currently stored in the world? That's on the order of 10^24, which is something like 1 million exabytes, which is a million squared terabytes, right?
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by mfukar on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @06:29AM (#10151580)
The amount of digitally stored information in the world as of May 2009 [1] is in the order of 2^71. There's no way a single process in a Linux distro will live long enough to read 2^80 bytes for the foreseeable future.

[1] http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/may/18/digital-cont...

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by raverbashing on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @02:54AM (#10151049)
No, it's called being safe

And I wouldn't put it past them to have an attack (at least theorectical) that exploits this

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by viraptor on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @03:16AM (#10151113)
There's safe and there's FUD. Nobody will read 2^80 bytes from urandom. You'll literally run out of time before that. It would take around 1,782,051,134 years to do on my system.

So if they write that there's a vulnerability after reading 2^80 bytes - that's great! We're secure. If they write that you must ensure to do something after 2^80 bytes - that's complete bullshit.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by raverbashing on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @04:34AM (#10151314)
Yes, reading 2^80 bytes for a practical attac is impossible today (and also for the near future)

However, remember when attacks to 3DES, MD5 were only theoretical?

Also, you may not even need to read 2^80 bytes, there might be a (future) vulnerability that allows you to shortcut this.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by RyanZAG on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @04:57AM (#10151360)
There are physical limits to our reality and it's very unlikely those limits can be broken (eg, speed of light). Given those limits, 2^80 is large enough that the limit cannot be surpassed without fully breaking reality (eg, timetravel).

If you can break reality, all bets are off though and trying to defend against attacks that break reality in the future are impossible.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by johncolanduoni on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @04:48AM (#10151340)
The difference is that weaknesses were found in 3DES and MD5. Increasing computing power was not the main factor. "Only" being able to produce 2^80 random bytes is a known and expected limitation. Sure, the CSPRNG could in theory be found to have a weakness, but that has nothing to do with the 2^80 bytes and the same could be said for virtually any cryptographic algorithm.
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by tptacek on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @10:17AM (#10152461)
What weaknesses in 3DES are you thinking about that yield practical attacks?
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by johncolanduoni on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @12:17PM (#10153484)
I am not arguing that there are; that was the parent comment. However, while the 3DES weaknesses don't yield practical attacks now, they still reduce the effective key length. My point was not that 3DES is different in that it is exploitable, but that it is different from the 2^80 limit in that the CSPRNG in that the later is not a result of a mistake in the algorithm's design but instead an expected feature. Just like the fact that any fixed-size key symmetric cipher is "limited" by that key size.

Now, if someone found a lower limit based on exploiting some weakness in the random number generation, the analogy with 3DES and MD5 would make more sense.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by tptacek on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @10:16AM (#10152457)
Which practical attacks on 3DES are you thinking of?
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by raverbashing on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @10:26AM (#10152538)
Just brute force basically

But there seems to be smarter attacks (ref 21) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES#Security

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by tptacek on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @10:30AM (#10152559)
Those are not practical attacks. But your argument hinges on their being non-theoretical attacks on 3DES. Are there others you were thinking of?
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by raverbashing on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @02:06PM (#10154471)
3DES might have been a bad example.

My point is that even if today some sizes and lengths seem only of theoretical concern, tomorrow there might be a vulnerability, a new approach to the problem, or even natural technological evolution that might turn it into a practical attack (even when it seems impossible today)

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by tptacek on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @02:42PM (#10154729)
But that's true of every cryptographic primitive. You can't make reasoned decisions based on that logic.
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by ReidZB on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @10:36AM (#10152604)
From what I recall, the consensus is that the smarter attack is less efficient than brute force overall.
Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by viraptor on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @12:45AM (#10150774)
> in which case application developers may prefer to implement a DRBG using /dev/random as a conditioned seed.

Wait, what? dev/urandom is a DRBG seeded the same way dev/random is. This doesn't seem to make sense.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by sago on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @04:48AM (#10151341)
Nods

You're very unlikely to be continually reseeding your own DBRG with new entropy, so it will be less secure than /dev/urandom, which is.

Suspiciously bad advice, there, from what I can see.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by viraptor on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @08:03AM (#10151802)
Just as a random counter-example, Openssl does use that method. But it actually seeds from urandom, rather than random... And fails when forking/threading by default. :(

But yes, that's not common. (more info: http://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Random_Numbers)

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by nshepperd on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @12:32AM (#10150743)
Is the joke that this is awful advice?

(Except for saving the entropy pool between reboots, which can be useful, afaik.)

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by ben_bai on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @07:03AM (#10151653)
> application developers may prefer to implement a DRBG using /dev/random as a conditioned seed

No. Doing random in userland is just wrong. If your program has access to /dev/urandom, use it. If not, use arc4random().

> “Random Number Generators: Introduction for Operating System Developers”

Or look how OpenBSD does it. (getentropy(), arc4random(), the subsystem)

> The entropy pool used by /dev/urandom must be saved between reboots.

OpenBSD does this, and more. The bootloader basically seeds the kernel with old entropy from before the reboot.

Re:Myths about /dev/urandom by geofft on Tuesday September 01, 2015 @01:02PM (#10153910)
> - The entropy pool used by /dev/urandom must be saved between reboots.

Every single Linux distro does this.