A recent talk (I don't recall the conference) on de-anonymising anonlymous online communications shows sharp limits to even this, though there is some workfactor required. Better than nothing.
While technically true, it doesn't help the situation.
Against the NSA, yeah, you have to be perfect. However, most adversaries are not the NSA.
Encryption on the wire stops random eavesdropping on you while someone else is a target. Having your mail store on a colocated box instead of Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo means that someone has to get a warrant and physically access your machine rather than filling in an automated request and having it turned over.
It's a modification on the old joke: "Sure, if the tiger is after me, I have to outrun the tiger. But if the tiger is simply hungry, I just have to outrun you."
We have a need for both solid anonymity and zero anonymity. I think the first step is to be able to authenticate whom you are communicating with, and to reach them without a central authority. After that, you can choose to strip identifying information, or build a web of trust, or anything else. I think privacy can be built on top of an authenticated net, but the reverse is probably not possible. Today we have neither.
I think it makes perfect sense to call it "onion routing of email" or something along those lines -- we generally do talk about "routing emails" (as in from email program to local smtp server, from local smtp server via an ISP smtp server, then lookup via DNS for MX record, on to the gateway smtp server, and so on to the final destination(s)).
[ed: Not to mention one thing probably stays the same: who runs the best, free onion routers/gateways and mixmaster servers? Intelligence agencies...
http://veps.hypertekst.net/misc/anon-remail/
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Anything less than that is like using snake oil crypto: it might make you feel good, but it's not really there.