For a different illustration, sure, with the right key, a plaintext of "ATTACK US AT DAWN" will have a ciphertext of "ATTACK US AT DAWN". Which, you know, in isolation, sounds undesirable. But a ciphertext of "ATTACK US AT DAWN" will be equally likely (from an attacker's perspective, who has no advance knowledge of the plaintext content or the key) to correspond to a plaintext of "ATTACK US AT DUSK" or "ABORT US ATTACKS" or "DEFEND UK AT DUSK" or "LAUNCH FAST DRONE".
(In fact, if you could guarantee that the ciphertext was never the plaintext, that would be an undesirable feature, because then if you knew the ciphertext and the encryption method without knowing the key or plaintext, you would learn information about the plaintext -- specifically, that it was not whatever the ciphertext was.)
"Let’s choose the very first key (in alphabetical order): AAAAAAAAAA. When we encrypt our plaintext of ONETIMEPAD with this key, we end up with a ciphertext of… ONETIMEPAD. Oops."
Yeah, so what? He knows the plaintext already. An attacker doesn't and as you point out, there's nothing in the key that provides any information about the plaintext.