I would imagine that information imbalance increases make a market less efficient, not more efficient.
How so? Can you flesh out the scenario a bit since I'm having trouble seeing how this is the case. To me, it seems like if there were no trade prohibitions on insider trading the share price would immediately reflect inside knowledge, thereby protecting amateurs from making investments based on facts that they don't know that others do.
A stock price reflects a weighted average of individual investor's knowledge and their capital.
(Efficient market gets around this by assuming people are cool with not just selling the stock but shorting it all the way until it is as low as they think it should be. People don't tend to bet the farm (or have the ability to borrow funds to bet the farm) like that.)
There's time taken to submit data to a central clearing house and time taken for them to publish it.
Many people may not want you to have a real time feed letting people know what shares they have just sold.
There also exist accounting cycles and hence corresponding disclosure cycles. CEOs can make non related entity trades, mask trades, etc. Seasoned financiers are far smarter than the new entrant. They will find ways to reduce their "downside", and increase their upside.
You always want to ensure that new entrants are not left to the mercy and warm fuzzy feeling of finance experts. The rule is that they can't afford them.
While I agree with that in theory, in practise we see that the rest of the market is so hopelessly skewed in favour of insiders in one form or another it's like a sticky plaster on the stump of a severed leg; just look at the Facebook IPO, or high frequency trading.
One thought might be to partly counteract that with a transaction cost that rises over the course of the 3 minutes.
Not really, amateurs mostly make long term investments, they are not buying and selling based on quarterly reports. The only ones who would be affected by legal insider trading are the gamblers.
If there were 1K inside traders who were the only profit-makers, would the price of a security be more volatile than if there were 100K "outside" traders who all had a virtually equal chance of profit?
This isn't necessarily a problem. As a society, we've decided that we like having amateur capital in the markets more than we want the improved efficiency of allowing use of inside information. It's a tradeoff, and while both options have their merits, society has chosen one way.