Rick has had numerous problems over time with scammers wrapping Paint.NET with scumbag installers and with "backspaceware" distributions. He's documented these issues in his blog:
http://blog.getpaint.net/2009/11/06/a-new-license-for-paintn...
http://blog.getpaint.net/2007/12/04/freeware-authors-beware-...
http://blog.getpaint.net/2011/10/03/paint-net-v3-5-9-and-dow...
http://blog.getpaint.net/2010/12/22/photoshop-filters-and-mo...
For as long as I've used Paint.NET (since v1) his home page and download page have never obfuscated or tried to lure users into downloading and installing crapware.
EDIT: Just turned off my adblocker and see I'm sadly very wrong about the crapware download ads. My other points still stand though.
homepage: right below his link (paint.net 4.0...) is a "GET IT HERE" picture add which installs crapware
download page: pig green banner "START DOWNLOAD" above his text link for the download.
I have no sympathy whatsoever for him - he's directly benefiting from the same scummy industry he's complaining about.
Another example, as recently as 3 months ago a search on google for "chrome" would result in a few ads that were for malware like this.
The ones that are in the actual installers upset me a lot... more so in open-source, and one of the reasons people are starting to avoid source-forge like the plague.
I guess this might be one benefit of the Windows Store, as long as that hasn't been taken over. I haven't checked it in awhile nor know their guidelines.
As it stands, I get a little sad when I see a project still on or using SF.
> Over time, those notification and opt-in screens were “optimized” away as much as possible. They already “agreed” to our 23 page EULA when they were trying to install Paint.NET but accidentally clicked the wrong download button anyway, right?
I'd say that what he's talking about is those sites that offer software for download, and the download button is displayed under an advertisement which also shows an image of a download button. If you click on the ad (showing an image of a download button), you get the malware, instead of the Paint.NET installer that you were trying to download.
I suspect this was an example of one of the bait-apps that shonky download sites (download.com and now sourceforge.com etc) repackage with toolbar installers.
As for browser cookie storage, there's not much the browsers can do. Even if they were encrypted or obfuscated somehow, the browsers themselves would still need access so people would always be able to reverse-engineer the process.
The only way I could see them preventing the web-based install exploit would be to always require a password first (and not just rely on session cookies to identify the user). I'm not sure if Google is doing that now or not.
There are two technical holes in how this was achieved, disregarding the initial drive-by update install:
* Unprotected browser cookie storage
* Android web-based App Install requires no user interaction past a request to a web endpoint
Are these holes still open?