Many people have tried pointing out this design flaw to him.
I have a little bit of hope due to this quote from the getrandom(2) manpage: "Unless you are doing long-term key generation (and perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for /dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be sufficient for all purposes." The parenthetical and the second sentence give me some hope.
(Related question: is Linux using the most sensible CSPRNG it could be using?)
But even if that doesn't work, I can see a few ways around that. Most notably, /dev/random and its associated ongoing accounting could become optional. (This is already something I'd like to do for size reasons.) Then, for compatibility, random could be a symlink to urandom.
And yeah, between that and the ongoing battle against the Great Evils of hardware random number generators, the potential of Linux's randomness mechanism seems rather maintainer-limited.