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Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by tptacek on Sunday August 09, 2015 @01:03PM (#10030717)
I believe any such patch is doomed; the Linux randomness maintainer appears to be thoroughly convinced of the utility of /dev/random, which is unfortunate.

Many people have tried pointing out this design flaw to him.

Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by JoshTriplett on Sunday August 09, 2015 @01:28PM (#10030766)
That's exactly what I had in mind when I was asking for any specific citations you might have that address this. Random patch versus self-appointed "expert" won't go nearly as well as supporting evidence versus lack of supporting evidence.

I have a little bit of hope due to this quote from the getrandom(2) manpage: "Unless you are doing long-term key generation (and perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for /dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be sufficient for all purposes." The parenthetical and the second sentence give me some hope.

(Related question: is Linux using the most sensible CSPRNG it could be using?)

But even if that doesn't work, I can see a few ways around that. Most notably, /dev/random and its associated ongoing accounting could become optional. (This is already something I'd like to do for size reasons.) Then, for compatibility, random could be a symlink to urandom.

And yeah, between that and the ongoing battle against the Great Evils of hardware random number generators, the potential of Linux's randomness mechanism seems rather maintainer-limited.

Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by tptacek on Sunday August 09, 2015 @01:49PM (#10030835)
Making /dev/random blocking optional doesn't help; in fact, it probably hurts, because it allows more Linux code to "safely" use /dev/random, and that code is dangerous on platforms where /dev/random does the old Linux thing.
Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by JoshTriplett on Sunday August 09, 2015 @01:57PM (#10030855)
I'm not saying /dev/random's blocking would be optional; I'm saying the driver backing /dev/random would be entirely optional. Making it a link to urandom rather than having it entirely missing just avoids breaking old (misguided) userspace that still uses it; breaking userspace would make the proposal less likely to be accepted. Convincing various userspace components to switch to urandom, and for that matter fixing the documentation to stop recommending /dev/random, is a separate battle.