It would be a far simpler crypto design if it didn't insist on deniability as a feature.
OTR always operated in a weird niche, but it solved a specific problem for IM that everyone had. But simpler / more elegant protocols don't always win, and never because of the quality of the crypto. For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_public-key_infrastructu...
If you need deniability, you need it. Like, your life could literally depend on having it.
I'd say that justifies some protocol complexity.
Most of the protocols with forward secrecy and non-deniability also require synchronous communication to agree on ephemeral keys.
Deniability is almost a nice side effect of the asynchronous design. It doesn't seem like it adds tremendous complexity unto itself.
That's usually the sign of a good crypto design -- every bit of the message and computation is vital and can't be removed without everything else falling apart. Excessive round trips, duplicate fields, data sent twice -- these are all signs of a lousy design that probably has security flaws.