Trying to make one that does both leads to something that sucks at both.
That's not true either. Hashes are recommended to be used as input to KDFs.
"Modern password-based key derivation functions, such as PBKDF2 (specified in RFC 2898), use a cryptographic hash, such as SHA-2"
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_derivation_function#Key_st...
> Trying to make one that does both leads to something that sucks at both.
eh? Nobody is advocating that what-so-ever. Not me, not anybody.
I think you're now arguing with me for the sake of arguing with me. :-/
While KDFs do use hash functions internally, the hash function is an implementation detail.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/keccak_is_sha...
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/10/21/nist.html
tl;dr: Keccak is not a good partner for PBKDF2. It has good hardware performance but comparatively poor software performance. This benefits attackers with FPGAs or better.
At the time of the RFC publication it was already obvious its security was way behind bcrypt that was used in OpenBSD since 2.1 (June 1997), which did its best to be ASIC hostile, which isn't the case for PBKDF2.
In retrospect, NIST choosing PBKDF2 over bcrypt in NIST SP800-132 could be seen as part of the effort to weaken standards for NSA profit.
There is definitely a trade off between the two (performance on servers vs rate of passwords an attacker can crack). But generally the advice is to go for the slowest you can afford. Hence why KDF's have an iteration parameter so passwords can be hardened as harder gets faster.