varunsharma07
Tensorlake NPM package and repo compromised
The State of Open Source Supply Chain Attacks
Some additional detail from our analysis:
1. Provenance did not fail, it worked as designed and still shipped malware. The initial 11 packages were published through npm OIDC Trusted Publishing with valid SLSA attestations. The attacker compromised the maintainer's GitHub account and let the projects' own release workflows publish. Provenance proves which commit was built, not that the commit was authorized.
2. There is a booby trap on remediation: the worm installs a watcher that fires an attacker payload when the stolen GitHub token gets revoked. Remove the token monitor first, then rotate.
3. Persistence goes beyond node_modules. It writes .claude/settings.json (SessionStart hook) and .vscode/tasks.json (runOn: folderOpen), each re-executing the dropper. Check repo dotfiles too.
4. No C2 domain to sinkhole: exfil endpoints resolve at runtime from an Ethereum contract. Observed domain is npm-cache.com, but the operator can rotate it and push new code to infected hosts.
If you're auditing: look for setup.mjs, a 727,680 byte Math_Symbol.js (math_init.js in the second wave), and "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" in package.json. Careful, regenerate-unicode-properties ships a legitimate 1 KB Math_Symbol.js; the malicious one is over 700 KB.
Full IOC and package list in the post, updated as the campaign develops.
Immobiliarelabs NPM packages have been compromised
Codfish/semantic-release-action GitHub Action has been compromised
The StepSecurity Threat Intelligence Team has identified that multiple mastra npm packages have been compromised.
Multiple mastra NPM packages compromised
Ongoing NPM supply chain attack uses binding.gyp to spread like a worm
Laravel-Lang Supply Chain Attack
NX VS Code extension compromised again
Actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action Compromised
Malicious node-IPC Versions Published to NPM
It has been pulled from the npm registry now.
Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383
Hundreds of GitHub Python Repos Compromised via Account Takeover and Force-Push
Show HN: Scan your dev machine for AI agents, MCP servers, and IDE extensions
Xygeni/xygeni-action GitHub Action is compromised – poisoned tag is still live
These attacks only work when maintainers opt into dangerous patterns without guardrails.