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We (StepSecurity) published a full analysis of both payload stages: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/chaindrop-npm-worm

Some additional detail from our analysis:

1. Provenance did not fail, it worked as designed and still shipped malware. The initial 11 packages were published through npm OIDC Trusted Publishing with valid SLSA attestations. The attacker compromised the maintainer's GitHub account and let the projects' own release workflows publish. Provenance proves which commit was built, not that the commit was authorized.

2. There is a booby trap on remediation: the worm installs a watcher that fires an attacker payload when the stolen GitHub token gets revoked. Remove the token monitor first, then rotate.

3. Persistence goes beyond node_modules. It writes .claude/settings.json (SessionStart hook) and .vscode/tasks.json (runOn: folderOpen), each re-executing the dropper. Check repo dotfiles too.

4. No C2 domain to sinkhole: exfil endpoints resolve at runtime from an Ethereum contract. Observed domain is npm-cache.com, but the operator can rotate it and push new code to infected hosts.

If you're auditing: look for setup.mjs, a 727,680 byte Math_Symbol.js (math_init.js in the second wave), and "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" in package.json. Careful, regenerate-unicode-properties ships a legitimate 1 KB Math_Symbol.js; the malicious one is over 700 KB.

Full IOC and package list in the post, updated as the campaign develops.

Re:Multiple mastra NPM packages compromised on Tuesday June 16, 2026 @10:10PM (#48564926)
Mastra is an open-source TypeScript framework for building AI agents, workflows, and RAG pipelines.

The StepSecurity Threat Intelligence Team has identified that multiple mastra npm packages have been compromised.

Re:Laravel-Lang Supply Chain Attack on Friday May 22, 2026 @09:04PM (#48243490)
On May 22, 2026, an attacker with push access to the Laravel-Lang GitHub organization rewrote every git tag across multiple popular Composer packages within a single 15 minute window.
Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise on Tuesday May 12, 2026 @12:47PM (#48110796)
We have built an AI Package Analyst https://app.stepsecurity.io/oss-security-feed and also monitor them using https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner for runtime behavior.
Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise on Monday May 11, 2026 @07:11PM (#48101988)
@mistralai/mistralai npm package was also compromised as part of this worm https://github.com/mistralai/client-ts/issues/217

It has been pulled from the npm registry now.

Re:Postmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise on Monday May 11, 2026 @05:08PM (#48100707)
The Mini Shai-Hulud worm is actively compromising legitimate npm packages by hijacking CI/CD pipelines and stealing developer secrets. StepSecurity's OSS Package Security Feed first detected the attack in official @tanstack packages and is tracking its spread across the ecosystem in real time.
Re: on Sunday March 15, 2026 @05:37PM (#47392215)
The StepSecurity threat intelligence team discovered that dev-protocol — a verified GitHub organization with 568 followers belonging to a legitimate Japanese DeFi project — has been hijacked and is now being used to distribute malicious Polymarket trading bots.
An attacker is compromising hundreds of GitHub accounts and injecting identical malware into hundreds of Python repositories. The earliest injections date to March 8, 2026, and the campaign is still active with new repos continuing to be compromised.
The root cause is workflows that grant trust to untrusted inputs: pull_request_target that checks out and executes fork code with repo secrets, ${{ }} expressions that interpolate branch names/filenames into shell commands unsanitized, and issue_comment triggers with no author_association check.

These attacks only work when maintainers opt into dangerous patterns without guardrails.

We analyzed an autonomous bot (hackerbot-claw) that's actively scanning GitHub repos for exploitable Actions workflows. It hit Microsoft, DataDog, a CNCF project, and awesome-go (140k stars) achieving RCE in 4 out of 5 targets and exfiltrating a GITHUB_TOKEN. Full breakdown of the 5 attack techniques with evidence.
[email protected] was published with a malicious post-install script that silently installs OpenClaw on any machine running npm install.
A case study on detecting npm supply chain attacks through runtime monitoring and baseline anomaly detection

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