unknownhad

Hello OP here I was one of the 1100 people impacted by the recent layoff. Thats when I started looking into offensive security/exploit writing more closely and actively. I have been doing blue teaming/defender's work for over a decade. While I knew about and had explored exploit writing, I had never done it as my day job (mostly for fun and CTF events). As I had no job and some downtime, I started looking into it.

My 1st blog post was about a V8 exploit: https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/08/i-had-some-free-time-... This is the 2nd one, about kernel exploitation.

My aim is always to write in a way that people without much hands on experience with exploit dev can still understand and learn from. Feel free to share your questions/comments or ways I can make these blogs even more reader/beginner friendly. m happy to answer any technical questions, though I believe HN folks know much more than I do about the Linux kernel.

It's a Smol side project additions/updates welcome.

This looks like an interesting proposal. My previous post : https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure... Highlight the issues some of these can be fixed by these, IIRC BSD already had similar feature.

I think this assumes software is a static target (Which it is not) . We are not just using LLMs to scan old code developers are using LLMs (like Copilot and others) to write new code and they are doing it by the shovel-load. The pace of shipping has gone up which means the pace of introducing new bugs has gone up right alongside it. The bug pool does not empty out because we keep refilling it every sprint.

Plus, the definition of the "easily found stuff" is a moving target. The AI models aren't static either. What takes a human reverse-engineer a week of deep insight today might just be a standard automated API call by 2027.

So while I would love for the dust to settle in a year, I think we are just looking at the new normal.

Thanks for reading the post and for the great counter-point!

The 90 day responsible disclosure window was built for a world where bug finders were rare and exploit development was slow. That world is gone. LLMs have compressed both timelines to near-zero. I have seen it first hand, and so has everyone else paying attention. This post lays out why the old model is broken, with real stories, and makes one ask to the industry: treat every critical security issue as P0 and patch it immediately.

I have received an Email today. I was using https://www.hndigest.com/ Kudos to the person behin.

All the Emails were from `hello @ hndigest.com` W00ps, My understanding was this is from HN.

While looking for a way to stream the India vs Pakistan cricket match on 14th September 2025, I stumbled across a suspicious search result on a europa.eu dev subdomain. It was being abused for blackhat SEO and redirecting users to scam streaming sites. I traced similar behavior across other high-profile domains, reported the issue to CERT-EU via email (after some Twitter help) and the problem was later confirmed as fixed on 6th November 2025. This post walks through how I found it, how I reported it and what we can learn from it.