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sudoyear123

Re:Delegated Credentials in TLS on Friday November 01, 2019 @02:46PM (#21422373)
This is a very good question. We actually did consider proxy certs and name constraints certs first and had a long discussion at the IETF about these different options. At the end the consensus was that it would be much better to have a very minimal structure which could only do 1 thing and nothing else. DCs also have the advantage that they are cryptographically bound to a particular End entity certificate vs a particular public key only, and hence can only be used with their properties, so it really is the minimal possible thing you need and nothing more.
Re:Delegated Credentials in TLS on Friday November 01, 2019 @12:59PM (#21421039)
As a CA you can issue certificates for other domains as well which might be undesirable. There are existing mechanisms such as Name constrained CAs and proxy certificates to reduce this scope. While they were originally considered there are issues with them. There is no widespread support for either and there is no way to know whether both sides support them. DCs allow for a extremely minimal subset of what you might need to issue credentials with your own lifetime and it only affects you. DCs are cryptographically bound to the leaf certificate as well. A bunch of this is documented in the draft.
Re:Delegated Credentials in TLS on Friday November 01, 2019 @12:46PM (#21420860)
generalized asn1 parsing can be super tricky and the industry is generally avoiding asn1 for new protocols. There has been some really interesting work from microsoft on verified parsers for asn1 https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-ramananandro_0.pdf
Re:Delegated Credentials in TLS on Friday November 01, 2019 @12:13PM (#21420391)
DER encoded ASN.1 is used for the X.509 end-entity certificate, however generally this follows how CertificateVerify works in TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.3
Re:Building Facebook's Service Encryption Infastructure on Wednesday May 29, 2019 @02:49PM (#20043894)
This would make a great comparison. I'm not certain whether or not K8's mutual auth supports session ticket resumptions and distribution of short lived ticket keys. The ticket rotation design would probably make a great addition to K8. There are a lot of intricate details in design which can make a major difference in not only performance but also whether or not the system wakes you up at night.
Re:Building Facebook's Service Encryption Infastructure on Wednesday May 29, 2019 @11:08AM (#20041064)
Ya they're similar in that they are all signed blobs of data, but different in the sense that they are specifically designed to send authentication information via several layers of proxies
Re:Building Facebook's Service Encryption Infastructure on Wednesday May 29, 2019 @10:29AM (#20040587)
There are several access control mechanisms. One such ACL as mentioned in the post is identity certificates which are used to perform access control. Other mechanisms for identity are CATs which have been talked about in the past https://rwc.iacr.org/2018/Slides/Lewi.pdf and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kY-Bkv3qxMc