sonusario

https://static.berkeleyearth.org/memos/fugitive-methane-and-...

Agreed. I think part of the issue stems from how people define freedom, seemingly thinking that freedom means "no rules".

For example: If having rules is intrinsically against freedom, then why would anyone who desires freedom play sports, where rules define the game. If you eliminate the rules, you eliminate the game and your freedom to actually be able to play it.

Clarifications, yes. Changes in dogma, no. Catholic doctrine has not changed since the death of the last apostle, John. It has developed, in the sense of being expounded upon for an increase in understanding (clarification), but it hasn't changed. Clarification often occurs in response to attempts at changing doctrine or promoting something which is contrary to doctrine.

You agree with the following claim: The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm".

Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality, then, in order to be warranted, you'd need to have a specific observation that would falsify the claim "The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim 'water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm'". But now the claim, that whatever observation you may describe would falsify the aforementioned, would also need to have an observation that would falsify it.

Any claim that some claim is falsified by some observation will also have to have a observation that falsifies that claim. Thus leading to an infinite regression (have fun showing your position is warranted when you have to detail an unending list of observations), circular regression (we both agree circular reasoning is not reasonable), or a first claim that is not falsifiable.

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> Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?

"Yes, DUH!", hence the question. What indicates to you that making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion?

> The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.

So you are not relying on me to describe to you a very specific observation that I would "accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that [I] believe in", in order to answer my question "How has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim"?

> Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?

We already selected the position "God exists". You've yet to demonstrate that it is not falsifiable. You are merely dodging the question with "It just is!"/"Because I said so!" like responses.

> A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.

Measuring the temperature of the water vapor at 150 °C coming off of liquid water at 149.9999 °C doesn't falsify that claim if you haven't checked lower temperatures. If you haven't checked every temperature from -273.15 °C to 150 °C at every possible precision, then you may have missed some other temperature at which it boils. More over, if the claim was "water does not boil only at 150 °C in 1 atm" vs "150 °C+ in 1 atm", then you'd also have to check every temperature at every possible precision above 150 °C to falsify that claim.

> You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".

Is it possible to make a tautological claim about reality?

> I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...

If you can always potentially falsify claim A which is the falsification of claim B, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been falsified. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been falsified, then it is not actually falsifiable, because if it were actually falsified then there would no longer be any potential for it to be not actually falsified. For a claim to not actually be falsifiable, when it is said to be falsifiable, is a contradiction.

In other words:

If you can always have the potential to show that claim A is false, which is a claim that states claim B is false, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false, then it cannot actually be shown to be false, because if it were actually shown to be false then there would no longer be any potential for it to have not actually been shown to be false. For a claim to not have the potential to actually be show as false, when it is said to have the potential to be show as false, is a contradiction.

> That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. ...

No, it is a problem resulting from your use of the word "is".

> I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?

In what context could some existing person be certain that they exist and be wrong?

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Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality:

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the first premise of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the second premise of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the conclusion of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "the claim 'water only boils at 100 °C+ in 1 atm' is falsifiable"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "'formal truths' are not about reality"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "claims about reality must be falsifiable to be warranted"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "there is no way to verify that perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'"?

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Have fun!

How do you know there is no certainty involved? How do you know certainty is not needed? If you are not certain, why not say "is likely" instead of "is"? ("There is likely no contradiction with my own position", "there is likely no certainty involved", "Religion is likely incompatible with science", etc.)

> You are simply refusing to agree that logic works unless I agree to making the assumption that I am certain of some other claims, even though you otherwise would agree that logic does work.

Logic works, your's doesn't, particularly because you are framing your conclusion using terms of certainty while also refusing to think that anything can be known with certainty.

Do you have a reason for not assuming something, even your own existence, can be known with certainty? What I've gathered from your previous replies would indicate that your main reason could be phrased as "there is no way to verify that my perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'".

Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

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To set things in order:

You claim that "Religion is incompatible with science" because, as you've claimed, they contradict in stating what is or is not warranted regarding the assertion of falsifiable claims.

Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims. Moreover, when I pushed you on this regarding a specific claim you provided, asking "Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?", you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The issues with that aside, if I where to answer that question similar to the way you answered one of mine...

"

s> "After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?"

z> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

"

... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Your argument also fails on the grounds of not having a coherent use of the term "falsifiable":

You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

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You have less basis for your claim "Religion is incompatible with science" than you have of the the claim "Some claims can be known with certainty".

Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way. Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

> Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does.

Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

> The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had. Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

> How would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct?

By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

> How is that relevant to our conversation?

Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation. Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

> I don't see how, could you explain?

Your statement "There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything", expresses a lack of certainty in all claims, which includes tautological claims and claims of awareness, "awareness" being comparable to "senses".

If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false. You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

I don't mean "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise" when I say certain. I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

> So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

> There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so.

Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

> There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything.

Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness: "Which you can't [with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false] because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false."

So apparently you are uncertain that you've just stated "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about"... lol, wow.

Haha, are you certain you won't answer any further questions about whether you are certain about something until I show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about? If not, are you certain that you are not certain? If so, well then now you know there is something you can possibly be certain about. If not, are you certain?

> Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

Smh, tsk tsk. I do apply it to other things. At the moment, however, we are dealing with your "uncertain" claims, a burden which is evermore appearing to be too much for you, especially now, given that you have now revealed that you've not intended to say anything with certainty. Perhaps, for all future claims you make, it would serve us well if you included wording that indicates your uncertainty.

> Just remove "certainly".

If you're going to remove certainty from all of your claims, then we have reached the end of our discussion. I'm content with you not being certain of the claim "Religion is incompatible with science". You may feel that one can't be certain of anything, but it is certain that you can't be certain of that.

> The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any.

Well according to you, you are not certain that you doubt it. In addition, by your own expectations of uncertainty, you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it), and, to continue, you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it)), and you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it))), and so on...

Oh, and if you want to replace all certainty with likelihood, as in stating that "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" to highlight your uncertainty of the claim "Religion is compatible with science", then the claim "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" would also be uncertain. This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above. So... have fun with that.

And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine? You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false. What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

> I didn't claim I had a certain basis.

So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

So, by your words, every falsifiable claim is not falsifiable with certainty, because any claim X that states the falsification of some falsifiable claim Y can be falsified.

> As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

How do you know this with certainty?

As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

I have never stated that I thought this. You may have thought my wording implied that, but that has never been what I was getting at. You've incorrectly inferred this on your own, so I never addressed any statement you made regarding it as it was getting away from the point. But clearly since you've struggled to wrap your head around that, I've now spelled it out for you.

> It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

No, I've been getting at asking why you think people mean "the method used to arrive at claim X is reliable" rather than something like "claim X can be trusted for use", when "claim X is reliable" is stated.

Your stance is also noticeably less coherent when it is considered that "claim X" can't be replaced by "this wrench" or "this car" and not lack significant ambiguity ("the method used to arrive at this car is reliable"). Where as if you were to replace "claim X" in "claim X can be trusted for use" for "this car", you'd get "this car can be trusted for use".

What you've done is equivocate, using "reliability" differently for claims versus how it is used in all other areas. In particular using it in reference to X on one hand and in reference to the method that derived X on the other, which has nothing like a mechanical analog to help indicate that your usage is one that matches the usage of anyone else outside of your own head.

> Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

Then perhaps what you mean is: Made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue than claims that are not made up. If that is the case are you asserting that "Any method that doesn't make up claims has a greater probability of being true than any methods that do make up claims"?

> Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes?

So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

> So?

According to you: The assertion of any claim that is not falsifiable is not warranted.

This has no certain basis, by your definitions. As a result this means that no claim should be ignored just because it is currently considered to not be falsifiable.

Another question comes to mind. Say you claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm". You then perform a test on water at "1 atm", and it boils at 100°C. Having falsified the original claim, according to you, you can now say "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm".

After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

> Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable". To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

> The way "the reliability of the claim" is commonly used is simply as a short-hand to refer to what more precisely would be called "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim".

Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

> Do you agree that made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true?

If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

> Seems sensible to me!

Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

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> By showing that whoever is holding the supposedly unfalsifiable position would actually accept some demonstrations as reasons to reject the claim?

Are you asking me?

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0) According to you: If X is falsifiable, then X "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all".

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1) If the claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable, then "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Substitution 0)

2) According to you: The claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable"?". (ASSUMPTION)

3) Therefore: The "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Conditional Elimination from 1, 2)

=======

In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

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>> Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

> Are we talking about "reliable for detecting ultimate reality" or "reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting"?

Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

Wut?? If you can't see that "the reliability of the claim itself" =/= "the reliability of the method that is used to establish that claim", then I think we are done here because this would make for an insuperable disagreement. In the first phrase 'reliability' refers to the claim, and in the second it refers to the method. The claim and the method that is used to establish that claim are two different things.

> Yes, I have, over, and over, and over, even in my last post.

No you haven't. The method 'making-things-up' we already agree is unreliable, but you have not established that non-testable claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true. If I missed it, perhaps you could quote what you think has been so obviously stated that you needn't bother repeating it? I'll ask you to include an inequality proof and/or the percentages that have been calculated to reach/assert this conclusion.

> But the phrase "claim A is reliable" makes perfect sense without a "for X", simply as an expression of how likely the claim is to be true.

So you think these phrases are equal?: "claim A is reliable" = "it is likely claim A is true" = "the method that is used to establish claim A is reliable"

> Being a correct description of reality is what makes a claim useful for making predictions about the future behavior of that reality, and thus for influencing reality in such a way that a satellite does behave as intended/predicted.

And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?

> No, I am not, I am simply performing the empirical observation that is required to establish whether the claim is testable.

If you are performing said observation now to form a basis for your claim, did your claim not have a basis before?

> But ultimately, what counts is whether whoever is making the claim would accept those demonstrations as contradicting their claim.

So, whether a claim is falsifiable is subjective?

Also, are claims of the form "X is not falsifiable" falsifiable? If so, how might they be falsified?

> If you mean whether our senses generally produce a coherent picture of an outside world: That is falsifiable, in that we can cross-correlate different senses, between perceptions of the same sense over time, as well as between our own and others' perceptions.

Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

Your argument states "Science says that untestable claims about reality are unreliable" and not "Science says that making things up is not a reliable way to determine truth". Your argument also states "Religion says that certain untestable claims about reality are reliable" and not "Religion says that making things up is a reliable way to determine truth". There is a difference between the reliability of finding the truth by making up a claim and the reliability of the claim itself.

Your argument (from what I can tell as it is written) is not about the reliability of making up a claim but about the reliability of a claim itself. Even if your argument were referring to the reliability of making up a claim, I don't know of any religion that says or concludes that making up claims is reliable. Even if one did, that wouldn't lend itself to making the blanket statement "Religion says ...".

> "reliability of a claim" means the probability that the claim is true, based on what you know. The fact that some of the claims might be true does not mean that the probability of any particular claim being true is high.

Defining, conversely, the "unreliability of a claim" as the probability that the claim is false, your argument becomes the following:

> 1) Science says that untestable claims about reality have a probability of being false.

> 2) Religion says that certain untestable claims about reality have a probability of being true.

> 3) Therefore, religion's claims as to the probability of being true of some claims about reality contradicts science's claims as to the probability of being true of those claims.

Given that your argument makes no reference to what is more or less probable, no contradiction has been established (pending whether you mean unreliable to mean less likely and reliable to mean more likely (but then you'd need to establish how those probabilities were derived)). I don't want to put words in your mouth, so you may want to rephrase your argument because I doubt this is what you meant given that it does not establish your point.

> It's not reliable _for_ anything, it is simply likely to be a correct description of reality.

You can't/don't rely on scientific claims "_for_" anything? As in, the claims of science are not reliable for things like putting satellites into orbit or pursuing further truths, they are just likely a correct description of reality?

>> Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?

> What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?

You're shifting the burden of proof. I have at least five independent criterion, but you don't need to know them. Not having something to accept as falsification for the claim "water only boils at 100°C or greater (under 1 atm)" doesn't mean that there can't be one. So unless you have some solid demonstration of your claim, because lack of evidence doesn't seal the deal, then you have no convincing basis for claiming "'God exists' is not a falsifiable claim".

> All you are really saying here is "What if reality isn't real?" ...

Hahaha, what?? Not at all! I'm saying that, given what seems to be your want of disregarding all non-falsifiable claims as "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up", you'd also be disregarding the claim "our senses our reliable" as "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" because that claim is not falsifiable in principle (it being non-falsifiable something we seem to agree on since we think it is self-evident).

If you think the claim "our senses are reliable" is falsifiable, then YOU would be the one likely to assert the question "What if reality isn't real?".

> And yes, I am aware that I am skipping a lot of stuff. ...

Thank you for mentioning it. I couldn't tell if stuff was being missed or ignored. It can be easy to miss things in walls of text.

> ... so I think we are better off concentrating on that for now ...

Sure, I've done more skimming myself.

How do you determine that a claim is not falsifiable? How do you determine that a claim is unreliable?

When you say "Science says", do you mean "Science is defined as such ..." or "Science has arrived at the conclusion ..."? When you say "Religion says", do you mean "All religions assert ..."?

> Because they are indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up. Do you agree that making shit up is not a reliable way to determine facts about reality?

While I agree that making shit up is not reliable, some claims that are "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" aren't necessarily untrue. Given that claims "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" could be true, one might think that there may be claims which, though are non-testable, are reliable for use. If that is not the case, then you have to establish the claim "non-testable claims are unreliable" in order to support what you're saying sciences asserts ("that untestable claims about reality are unreliable").

Also, when you say a claim is reliable, what is it reliable for?

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s> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

z> No.

s> Why?

?

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> ... testability ... is about whether the claim could be shown to be false. ... The requirement is that you could potentially demonstrate it to be false if it were false.

You may need to elaborate for me, because true claims can't potentially be shown to be false in principle. So, are we calling claims falsifiable because we don't know beyond inductive reasoning that they are true and can out of ignorance come up with test that potentially demonstrates they are false?

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z> Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable.

s> Is "use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't" a fixed method?

?

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> Religion: "It is warranted to believe that a god exists."

> Science: "It is not warranted to believe that a god exists."

Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?

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> WTF? Yes... ... seriously?

Oh, so you agree that science relies upon the reliability of the senses and that the claim "our senses are reliable" is not falsifiable in principle?

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z> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

s> When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.

??

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z> The answer is simply: They didn't.

s> The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.

??

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s> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

z> I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so.

s>Then you can't see any reason to believe '1 < 2' could make reference to anything other than the physical representations of distances of space, cardinalities of sets, and any other needed mathematical structures?

?

===

> Did you change anything?

Did you read it? The first argument contains 18 points and said "X has". The second argument contains 16 points and does not say "X has".

> This is again treating the explainability as a property of X, which is incoherent nonsense.

Could you quote something from the second argument that treated "explainability as a property of X"?

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> So, how does that distinguish the physical from the non-physical, when the physical isn't even mentioned?

I guess the implication wasn't obvious enough. To exist and be physical is to exist and be capable of changing state, to exist and be capable of changing state is to exist and be physical.

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> ... unless you are saying that it is possible to act in a way that is not in accordance with how you choose to act ... which is just gibberish.

"Intend" is probably a better word than "choose".

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> No, but I expect that anyone who is serious about a discussion doesn't just suddenly dump on me some outlandish claims with the expectation that I will accept them for the purposes of building arguments on them.

Like 'claims only about math are not claims about reality'?

How do you determine that something is not testable? How do you determine that something is unreliable?

When you say "Science says", what do you mean? When you say "Religion says", what do you mean?

>> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

> No.

Why?

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> Yeah ... so? They are still wrong, and I am most likely not.

How do you know that there is a greater chance that you are not wrong? What are the percentages you have calculated to conclude this?

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> Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable.

Is "use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't" a fixed method?

> It is well-established that untestable claims are unreliable (and I have explained at length why)

Would you please explain "at length" once more in the form of a syllogism that ends with the conclusion "Therefore all non-testable claims are unreliable"?

> Either there is indeed a good reason to think it is in fact true, then science is wrong and needs to be corrected so it doesn't classify a reliable claim as unreliable

It's becoming more clear that we seem to have different criterion for what we consider testable. Would you consider all claims that are provable or disprovable testable? Would you consider all claims that if true, and not provable or disprovable, are not testable?

> No, the incompatibility comes from the fact that both are claims about the same subject matter, namely reality, and that those claims are contradictory.

What are some claims of science and religion (regarding religion, particularly fundamental ones) that are contradictory, as in they claim opposing things (X and ~X)? Or are the only claims that are incompatible as far as you are concerned the ones stated in your above syllogism?

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> All I mean is that you (kindof) have to make some assumption of sorts, because there is no way to prove ultimate reality or disprove hard solipsism.

So, there is some first self-evident method that can't be tested for reliability without being circular?

> You do know that by definition. Senses are, by definition, those inputs that reflect external reality.

A definition you have assumed? Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying anything is wrong with that assumption, it is a self-evident one, but call it like it is.

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>>> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

>> When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.

>>> The answer is simply: They didn't.

>> The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.

?

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>> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

> I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so.

Then you can't see any reason to believe '1 < 2' could make reference to anything other than the physical representations of distances of space, cardinalities of sets, and any other needed mathematical structures?

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> The primary problem with that whole argument is that it considers having an explanation a property of the thing to be explained, rather than of the subject (not) understanding the thing.

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1 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible.

2 ) If X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted.

3 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted, then all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible.

4 ) If all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible.

5 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted.

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6 ) X is a part of reality and X can't be explained (ASSUME for RAA)

7 ) X is a part of reality (Conjunction Elimination from 6)

8 ) X can't be explained (Conjunction Elimination from 6)

9) X is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 1, 8)

10) X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality (Conjunction Introduction 9, 7)

11) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 2, 10)

12) All claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 3, 11)

13) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 4, 12)

14) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 5, 13)

15) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted and the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conjunction Introduction 11, 14)

16) Therefore: It is not the case that X is a part of reality and X can't be explained (Reductio Ad Absurdum from 6 to a contradiction on 15)

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Rephrasing of the Conclusion: Either X is not a part of reality or X can be explained (De Morgan)

Rephrase of the Rephrasing: If X is a part of reality then X can be explained (Implication)

==========

> Could you then provide a criterion by which to distinguish the physical from the non-physical, that could be applied to an arbitrary object to determine whether it is physical or non-physical, and that's not using just vague terminology that could eaily be interpreted in a dozen different ways?

To exist and be non-physical is to exist and be incapable of changing state, to exist and be incapable of changing state is to exist and be non-physical.

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> Whether something is moral is completely determined by whether you think it is moral, and whether it is moral has no effect on whether it is moral?

Wow have I done a terrible job of separating the conscience act from the external act. To be abundantly clear, it is immoral to violate your conscience. There can be two actions that occur when you perform an action: Choosing an action is itself an action, and performing the chosen action is separate from the choosing of that action. So if I where to correct my comments along these lines I would properly state: "It is immoral to [choose to] do what you think is immoral even if [what you choose to do] is moral, so you'll be better off doing [an action] you think is moral even if [that action] is immoral [because choosing to do otherwise would be immoral]. You are better off this way because you are not as/(at all) culpable for your actions if you didn't know they were wrong. That being said we are obligated to correct our neighbors' incorrect moral beliefs and to be open to being corrected."

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> Sorry, but your claims really are getting absurd.

Argumentum ad Lapidem

Do you expect all true claims to sound rational before you've heard their justification? What did you expect given that I haven't been taking any steps to establish them?

> Pretty much what you'd expect from someone who tries to find any justification for a predetermined conclusion, rather than following the evidence where it leads, though.

"Ad Hominem"

Ouch. Like you've done with 'claims only about math are not claims about reality'? (<- ad hominem)

That might be what you'd expect, but if you claim that's the kind of person I am then you'll need to substantiate that claim.

Lol, I've stated that I'm not taking any steps to establish my claims to you, as they don't usefully tie into to our compatibility discussion, several times now.

> ... it simply means that you are making unsubstantiated claims.

I've stated that I'm not taking any steps to establish my claims here several times now. Echo echo echo ...

> Yes, you said that to be physical is to be able to have measurable effect [...], but then denied that the measurable effects of the potential of the universe to change state (namely, the measured change in state) implies that the potential of the universe to change state is physical, while you also say that the same kind of measurement when applied to the effects of charged particles implies that electrons are physical ... so, it's completely incoherent.

Where did "'the measured change in state' is an effect 'of the potential of the universe to change state'" come from? I never stated this, thus you've made a straw-man and then drew comparisons with it to electrons, effectively making up the notion of me being incoherent.

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> So, it is, under certain circumstances, immoral to do what is moral?

Moral =/= immoral

> Like, how could a sentence of the form "X is moral" possibly mean anything other than "doing X is moral"?

It doesn't. There is more to the form of my sentences that you are clearly missing. My form is "A: X while you think X is immoral", "doing A is immoral".

Another way to think of it. "A: X while Y". A is moral when "X: Throwing darts" and "Y: aiming at a dart board". You can modify Y to "aiming at someones face" and make A immoral with out changing X.

> Either it's defined by one's personal opinion, then there is no objective definition, or there is an objective definition, then it's not defined by one's personal opinion. Both at the same time doesn't work.

Oh please. The objective definition incorporates subjective conditions. Ex: Define F as the set of propositions {A -> B, C -> D, A -> ~D, C -> ~B}. F is an objective framework which never changes, but what is derived from F is subject to the truth values of A, B, C, and D.

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> Now, I am making some assumptions based on how theists generally justify their position, and it is possible, though somewhat unlikely, that you have a completely different justification.

I'm curious. How do you think theists generally justify their position?

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> 1. You couldn't have picked a more biased example. If I were to show you that there exist millionaires who got rich with day trading, would you consider that evidence that day trading generally makes people rich?

False analogy. I'm claiming that everyone whom employs the methods of the saints achieves their goals of happiness. Your analogy would only be valid if everyone got rich with day trading, and if that were the case then that would be evidence that day trading generally makes people rich.

> If you want to figure out whether some method reliably gives a particular result, you have to look at all people who have [carried out] the method, not just those who are known for having ended up with a good result. Even terrible methods usually will not prevent all good outcomes.

Replaced "attempted the method" with "carried out the method" because you can fail an attempt, but to fail to attempt the method is to not follow the method. There is not a single known instance of a person having carried out the methods employed by the saints that didn't end up with good results.

> but it's not at all obvious that they were particularly good at achieving overall-happiness

Depends on how you are defining overall happiness. Many saints died joyfully while being tortured to death.

> If you wanted to compare methods, you would have to compare scenarios where either only one or only the other method is being used, or you risk misattributing results.

The problem you'll find with this is that you're not likely to find anyone who employs no aspects of the methods used by the saints, particularly because such a person, and you'd agree, would be completely depraved.

> I don't really know yet what assumptions to build on that you would share.

Then just start with something, and if I don't agree with your assumptions then we can decide where to go from there. It doesn't have to be perfectly formal, but at least needs to flow via enumerated propositions. I fail to see how avoiding to produce a formal argument for your position isn't an attempt at equivocation. Why else attempt to only argue informally where the informality is more likely to generate greater ambiguity?

> Yes. Example: ...

Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

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> ... I mean, unless you really do happen to have the evidence that everyone has been waiting for ...

Flat earthers may say the same to anyone whom tells them that there is great evidence that the earth is an oblate spheroid. Simply thinking that evidence isn't sufficient doesn't mean that it isn't.

> I don't understand what the distinction is that you are making here.

Science is a method. Doing science is to use the scientific method. The scientific method involves testing claims. Using the scientific method on non-testable claims is contradictory. The scientific method and the claims it has proven can co-exist with claims that can't be tested so long as those claims don't contradict the scientific claims. While those claims that can't be tested can co-exist with the scientific method, the incompatibility is in attempting to do science with those claims.

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> Well, let's see ...

Thanks :-)

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> And mind you that not much reliability is necessary in order to bootstrap this, because you can largely test that, too.

I get what bootstrapping means in compiler terms, but regarding methods of discerning truth, the notion of bootstrapping would seem to fly in the face of Gödel.

> But when you think about it, you'll notice that that assumption isn't actually necessary ... And as soon as there is even a little bit of structure to reality that you could figure out, building on your senses is going to outperform ignoring your senses.

Still sounds like your relying on the assumption that our senses are reliable... Like, you wouldn't know that using your senses out performs ignoring your senses unless you were already relying on your senses to determine that.

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> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.

> The answer is simply: They didn't.

The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.

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> Yes, those axioms, evaluations and derivations (well, particular aspects of them). Just the same way that 'Game of Thrones' has a referent, given the series, and characters of that series have a referent, given the series.

>>>>> The point is: A bunch of axioms and what results from them.

Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

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> No, you haven't. At best, you have shown that holding that position is not justified (arguably, you haven't done that either, but it doesn't really matter for this). ... Well, see above. You have to show that it is impossible for something to be unexplainable, not just that we don't know whether something is unexplainable.

Explain how I haven't. You're just saying I haven't. Where is the misstep in my argument (formalized below)?

==========

1 ) If X has no explanation, then X can't be explained.

2 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible.

3 ) If X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted.

4 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted, then all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible.

5 ) If all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible.

6 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted.

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7 ) X is a part of reality and X has no explanation (ASSUME for RAA)

8 ) X is a part of reality (Conjunction Elimination from 7)

9 ) X has no explanation (Conjunction Elimination from 7)

10) X can't be explained (Conditional Elimination from 1, 9)

11) X is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 2, 10)

12) X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality (Conjunction Introduction 11, 8)

13) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 3, 12)

14) All claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 4, 13)

15) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 5, 14)

16) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 6, 15)

17) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted and The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conjunction Introduction 13, 16)

18) Therefore: It is not the case that X is a part of reality and X has no explanation (Reductio Ad Absurdum from 7 to a contradiction on 17)

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Rephrasing of the Conclusion: Either X is not a part of reality or X has an explanation (De Morgan)

Rephrase of the Rephrasing: If X is a part of reality then X has an explanation (Implication)

==========