saligrama
Re:We let our cloud agents query prod (with OIDC, not secrets)
on Tuesday October 27, 2026 @03:53PM (#50264834)
Yes, exactly, a cloud agent always authenticates itself (via OIDC) as an agent (machine) identity, with the option for the identity of the human who launched it to ride along.
We then have the ability to enforce (extremely fine grained) policies based on that combined identity, plus any of the claims in the OIDC token (e.g., the repo URL), plus any of the data on the protocol itself (e.g., block non-read-only queries; redact anything sensitive).
Re:We let our cloud agents query prod (with OIDC, not secrets)
on Tuesday October 27, 2026 @03:53PM (#50264828)
Yes, exactly, a cloud agent always authenticates itself (via OIDC) as an agent (machine) identity, with the option for the identity of the human who launched it to ride along.
We then have the ability to enforce (extremely fine grained) policies based on that combined identity, plus any of the claims in the OIDC token (e.g., the repo URL), plus any of the data on the protocol itself (e.g., block non-read-only queries; redact anything sensitive).
Security Debt We Never Created
Down the rabbit hole: Implementing SSH port forwarding over AWS Session Manager
How practical should computer science degrees be, anyway?
How to Create a Stanford Course
Re:When your classmates threaten you with felony charges
on Monday August 28, 2023 @03:27PM (#37299235)
Baserunner [1] does exactly this. I described using it for Firebase security research in my blog post [2].
[1] https://github.com/iosiro/baserunner
[2] https://saligrama.io/blog/post/firebase-insecure-by-default/