quotheth
Because they are the ones who understand the necessary capabilities of their program and the ones who have access to the source code...
> That's a huge waste of time and it's much more efficient if the operating system or the user enforces it instead by using existing sandboxing technologies like firejail.
Actually it's a far better sandbox when built into the program. And it doesn't leave users relying on installing arcane operating systems or becoming technically savvy.
> It is also untrustworthy and insecure, since after all you don't trust the application.
No, trusting the application is implicit since it's installed by the user. The sandbox exists to protect against a compromised application.
Leaving this to the user leaves the vast majority of users unsafe. This is an unacceptable state.
What I will say is that in many cases an attacker is far more capable of MITM than they are of posting forum comments, or otherwise convincing you to click a link. A phishing campaign is noisy - you are often alerting many parties that you're malicious. MITM within a network is much stealthier and you don't have to rely on users clicking on anything.
Really, they're just completely different attacks and the existence of one has no bearing on the other. TLS on every page would close off real attacks and, if it forced attackers to use noisy methods like phishing, that's a huge win.
Can you not just create a certificate and push it to the system as a trusted cert?
> And opening ports would make the appliance even more vulnerable to attack.
Presumably there is already some sort of communication going on if they're receiving Chrome updates.
I'd say the main issue is that anyone between you and that website can inject scripts into the site in order to phish/ exploit you.
And why would they think outside of their internet only box when they're providing an internet browser?
Can you please elaborate?
With just CSS this should be impossible/ very unlikely. I guess it is probably technically possible, but I do not expect to see exploits using just CSS.
With HTML5 idk, that's really outside of my area.
What is 'good production code' ?
* Few errors * Readable, well documented * Testable, has tests, has testing tools like quickcheck, fuzzing, etc * Meets performance constraints
Rust hits those better than any language I've used. The downside is, oh gosh, you'll have to actually learn a programming language that isn't just another variation of the ones you learned in school.
"The only interesting thing" is a bit disparaging haha that's kind of a big deal. It means that third party iframes, as one example, run in a separate process. It breaks the case where I am evil.com, and you are okta.com, and there is a way for me to leak data within a process (or exploit the process), I can read okta.com's data.
With site isolation is this made considerably more difficult.
Please don't take it the wrong way, I think Firefox is awesome too :)
It's very helpful for counting within a product.
One simple example - A and B are browsers. A has a bounty program that they invest millions into, B does not.
A gets 100 vulnerability reports a month, B gets 5.
Is B safer?
No.
However, let's say we just look at A. It gets 100 a month, and then a new feature is added - suddenly it's 200 a month, and the vulns tend to be in the new codebase. That's interesting information for A - it has nothing to do with B.
What I will say is that Edge and Firefox are doing an excellent job - I'm really impressed. Chrome is still the safest browser today, in my opinion.
Site isolation, which was released recently, is a really great example of how far ahead they are - site isolation is at least 3, maybe 4 years in the making. That's serious work.
They have had an excellent bounty program. They have project 0 doing advanced offensive research, much of which has been relevant to browsers.
They fuzz a ton and have managed to solicit others to do the same (not that other browsers don't/ haven't).
Their sandbox is incredible and constantly evolving. They basically invented seccomp v2 just to improve their sandboxing stature on linux. They implemented 'forceaslr' before EMET was even a thing to help prevent info leaks from third party libs.
Their new kernel32.dll unloading mitigation is awesome, and as far as I know the first instance of such a thing.
I could really go on and on, I'm sure - they have taken incredible proactive measures and they're just getting better at it.
We can see similar growth in Edge, which has had a sandbox for years. Firefox has more recently gotten a sandbox and the move to rust is encouraging.
But... yeah, in my opinion, Chrome takes the cake.
It's totally irresponsible.
Instead, today, we see more companies invest in what's called "incident response". Part of a healthy incidence response program is signature detection - AV plays a role in this.
If you don't have good detection capabilities you're missing a huge portion of what makes an organization secure.
Relying on proactive users is also a recipe for disaster and not a realistic goal at all, nor should it be.
I linked to a far more informative post that actually discusses a technical issue. Frankly, the response should have been what was linked on HN, not some rant.
I can't believe the irony of telling me to "chill out" with personal attacks when commenting on a rant that is majority perosnal attacks.
Really? The long technical explanation, with the word "shouty" is not adult? The plea for sensible discussion?
Your post isn't worth responding to beyond that. You've taken extreme liberties in your reading of his response. "Directly insulting Linus" lmfao are you fucking kidding me? You're calling "shouty" as directly insulting, when it's a response to "Fucking morons" writing "garbage" code? This is disingenuous at best if not willfully ignorant.
Cheap jokes about Linus's behavior?????
Seriously, take a step back and realize the loops you're jumping through to try to somehow justify Linus's behavior by attacking a reasoned response to it.
I will try to be more straightforward.
You've stated that Linus has a unique role, and that he has to be this way or he'll lose the kernel/ essentially be worse at his job.
You've provided no examples or evidence (and I asked).
In your opinion, Linus must be this way, it is "just required" by his unique position. We have this totally unknowable position that you, for no apparent reason, assume is best suited to people who insult others publicly. And because this position is unique we can't compare him to others, by nature of the position.
You have essentially placed Linus in a position where you could basically justify anything. "Oh, well, it's a very unique role - you just have to be xyz for this sort of work".
The thing is, Linus's position may be unique, but it has a lot in common with lots of positions we have a good handle on. There are lots of open source leaders out there, lots of people who manage codebases, write code, etc. Maybe not exactly all of those things in exactly the same way, but we have plenty of similar positions.
I do not imagine a community so vehemently defending members of those positions who act like Linus. By your own admission this is a bad model for others in the same exact industry with similar roles - you even say they should be fired for acting the way he does.
So I guess my question is; what unique aspect of Linus's role makes him so different from everyone else with incredibly similar roles? What evidence is there that, against everything we know about positions like the one he fills, acting the way he does is the right way for his role?