nextgens

That property was useful both for improving availability AND censorship resistance: you could not attempt to "locate" where the blocks are without spreading them.

My naive understanding of the new design is that you can have contracts that are replicated... but they still cluster around the same place in the keyspace so any capable active adversary can actively deny access to content trivially. Did I misunderstand something here?

You've moving the debate here. The question was "How are the goals different?" from the project leader (who ought to know better), not whether moving them makes sense.

He has forked the project (to something that does not share the same goals so "fork" is arguable here), took the name, the cash and the goodwill.

We went from "we have enough donations/donators" to "how do we pay for the upcoming AWS bill?".

As someone who has been fairly active on the "old freenet", I have never cared about money nor funding... but I cannot help but notice that some has likely been misappropriated. Things like the SUMA award (https://web.archive.org/web/20150320201527/http://suma-award...) were awarded specifically for "protection against surveillance and censorship" that the "new freenet" does not even aim to provide.

"The board" of the non-profit seems to have been culled just before the decision. I don't know why, I wasn't on it. Maybe @agl can shime in (he was).

All I know is that this could have been handled better. It's what I wrote back then on https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg5527...

Please explain how "the new freenet" tackles censorship resistance.

https://web.archive.org/web/20001017133926/http://freenetpro... "Freenet is a peer-to-peer network designed to allow the distribution of information over the Internet in an efficient manner, without fear of censorship."

https://web.archive.org/web/20050201110519/http://freenetpro... "Freenet is free software which lets you publish and obtain information on the Internet without fear of censorship."

https://web.archive.org/web/20150206152355/https://freenetpr... "Share files, chat on forums, browse and publish, anonymously and without fear of blocking or censorship!"

today: "Hyphanet is peer-to-peer network for censorship-resistant and privacy-respecting publishing and communication."

the new freenet: ?!?

ECB, issues with key generation, key negotiation, seldom authenticated data, ...

It definitely works better than MT but please stop lauding it for its cryptographic properties ;)

It's at the bottom of their TODO, under the heading "V2 protocol spec".

One of the many things it brought is session tickets, enabling server-side session resumption without requiring servers to keep synced-up state. Another is Server Name Indication, enabling servers to use more than one certificate.

See https://searchfox.org/comm-central/source/mailnews/base/src/... , https://github.com/thunderbird/autoconfig/tree/master/ispdb and https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1602166

Why? three main reasons: (a) security (as you have identified isolation matters, but that is not the only thing), (b) get the benefits of "battle-tested" setups and (c) features

On security: in its default config, Mailu scans emails for malicious macros via oletools (and optionally viruses via clamav). It also uses a hardened-malloc, Snuffleupagus (a security module for PHP), gates all PHP code behind an authentication wall (webmails), ... and does both DANE and MTA-STS validation to ensure your emails are delivered to the right place. The authentication stack handles "smart" rate-limiting: you get to limit the number of authentications with distinct credentials over a time-period (a misconfigured thick client won't trigger it), you have plenty of ways to avoid running into it (application tokens for thick clients, per-device cookies that give you a way out, whitelisting of "used" addresses, ...) and you also get to rate limit the number of sent emails (useful if a spammer gets their hands on the credentials of one of your users)

On the importance of "battle-testing" setups: well, there are plenty of non-subtle ways of breaking an email setup. Experience has shown that all the layers in the stack can be problematic... I can give you a bunch of examples of what we ran into recently if you want.

On features: your setup might be simpler but your users are missing out. Whether it's enhanced filtering (like with oletools), better indexing (full text search), indexing of attachments (with OCR! via Apache Tika), configuring server-side rules with managesieve or just "having an interface" to configure ooo, change their passwords, configure aliases or delegate permissions.

I have started spending time on Mailu because I don't like the bloat that comes with Mailcow. Give Mailu a shot; it is reasonably easy to debug when things go wrong (and not written in PHP :p).

If you need any help, our support channel is on https://riot.im/app/#/room/#mailu:tedomum.net

At that point, shimming the zip-tie itself is probably easier/faster (and doable without specialized tools).

The goal here is tamper evidence... sure you can open the bag through the zipper but you won't be able to close the zipper back if you can't move the sliders.

It would be great to have a tool somewhere that matches client handshakes & supported CAs vs server config & choice of CA chains

IMHO It's clearly better than no TPM... as for whether it's better or worse than a physical chip, it's a different trade-off.

One one side you have:

- higher speed

- higher protection against physical attacks (if only because the die is larger... it's smaller and the "bus" isn't as trivial to interact with)

On the other:

- new side channels (think spectre, meltdown & friends) and they are probably easier to exploit thanks to the higher speed (more samples)

- more parties to trust (microcode, ME, ...)

- erasure is harder

For the specific purpose of hardening passphrases/keys ... use both. :p

It definitely does when there is no attempt made at protecting against it. L2 means "tamper evidence", you need L3 for things to start to be designed to prevent it from being "basic".

SGX is L3, you'll be hard pressed to find a TPM that does better than L2.

Phrasing it another way: Even if you don't have the skills/equipment to do it. How much do you think it costs to get someone to do it for you? How reproducible is that process? Why are we assuming it's hard?

Decaping a chip from a lost laptop is far from science fiction and can be performed at a fixed cost. Mitigation is super-cheap... There's just no good reason to store the "final" key on the TPM.

Here I interleave rounds of argon2id (configured with parameters that fit my system: use up all the RAM and all the cores since there's nothing else to do in the initrd) with HMAC rounds from TPM and/or SGX (configured with the right policies so that they rate-limit and only unlock if the PCRs check out).

IMHO the TPM should be a required piece but not the only piece of the puzzle. If I loose my laptop, I don't want the goods to be protected exclusively by a key that's trivial to recover from it (stored in something that's not a secure-element).

I've covered it in a talk I gave at 44con: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZTWjLTz4AE

tl;dr; Use the TPM (and potentially other technologies like SGX) as part of your KDF to strengthen PIN/passphrase that the user provides. This breaks the asymmetry of offline attacks (attacker will always be bound by TPM/SGX-speed). Do NOT give it the only key required to decrypt your data.

We don't advertise the linux/PAM support since we have failed to find a market for it (usually things end up being hooked up onto AD one way or the other)...

We have a video that shows how to set it up and basic operation: https://safepass.me/demo-video

We have a free "home-use" license: if your PC isn't hooked onto AD, it will just work. https://safepass.me/get-the-documentation https://safepass.me/download (the MSI)