micahflee
Using Signal Groups for Activism
TeleMessage Explorer: a new open-source research tool
TeleMessage customers include DC Police, A16Z, JP Morgan, and hundreds more
DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage
TeleMessage, used by Trump officials, can access plaintext chat logs
Technical analysis of TM SGNL, the unofficial Signal app Trump officials use
Hunting street-level cell phone surveillance with Rayhunter
The AP III militia's fraudulent charity front group
How to buy Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations, and how to get it for free
The doctor never should have prescribed hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19 because it was ineffective and the medical community already knew it at the time, and if they were going to they should have done a physical exam or taken labs to determine if it was safe first, and they didn't.
Left-Wing Voices Are Silenced on Twitter as Far-Right Trolls Advise Elon Musk
Russia Is Losing a War Against Hackers Stealing Huge Amounts of Data
Feds are tapping protesters' phones, here's how to stop them
Law Enforcement Websites Hit by BlueLeaks May Have Been Easy to Hack
Keep in mind that the username/password are just hex-encoded 128 bits from /dev/urandom, so they're not guessable at all without some sort of leakage attack, like a timing attack. And if anyone attempts to do a timing attack the person hosting the file will see all the requests scrolling down their terminal in real-time and can always hit ctrl-c.
There's also the bit about knowing the hidden service .onion to attack in the first place, which wouldn't be trivial to discover, especially since I envision these to mostly be very short-lived.
But all that said, this is great feedback. Keep it coming and feel free to open security issues on github.
Ubuntu shouldn't abuse trademark law to silence critics of its privacy decisions
There are about 100 root CAs, and something like 1000 CAs if you include intermediates (controlled by ~650 different organizations - https://www.eff.org/observatory), and browsers trust ALL of them. All it takes is one to issue a malicious cert, or to get hacked, to do a MITM attack on ANY domain without showing a browser warning.
The trustworthyness of a single CA doesn't make a difference, because if any CA isn't trustworthy then an attacker can use them instead the other ones. This is the problem with CAs, and the problem with centralized trust systems in general. There are hundreds of weak points.
But also, StartSSL does fairly thorough identity verification. I've had to send them photos of my passport and talk to them on the phone to do identity verification. It's also worth noting that it's the CA that both https://www.eff.org/ and https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/ use.
As long as there's a broken CA system, the choice of CA does not matter in the slightest as long as it's trusted by browsers. Users only care if it breaks a website with a scary warning, but if it doesn't, it doesn't matter. There's no need to spend money.
StartSSL does charge if you have more than very basic needs, like if you want multiple alt names, or if you want a wildcard. But it's still cheaper than the competition.
Last night we released a Chromium update that had a critical bug that broke the browser. As soon as we discovered this we removed it from the Chrome store temporarily until we could release an update.
We just released an update that fixes this bug, and it's back in the store again: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/https-everywhere/g...