metzmanj
And if that's the case, it was sloppy of "Jia" to disable it in OSS-Fuzz and not do this:
``` __attribute__((__used__,__no_sanitize_address__)) ```
to the XZ source code to fix the false positive and turn off the compilation warning, no attention would have been drawn to this at all since no one would have to change their build script.
With or without this PR, it's very unlikely OSS-Fuzz would have found the bug. OSS-Fuzz also happens to be on Ubuntu 20. I'm not very familiar with Ubuntu release cycles, but I think it would have been a very long time before backdoored packages made their way into Ubuntu 20.
I don't think it's plausible OSS-Fuzz could have found this. The backdoor required a build configuration that was not used in OSS-Fuzz.
I'm guessing "Jia Tan" knew this and made changes to XZ's use of OSS-Fuzz for the purposes of cementing their position as the new maintainer of XZ, rather than out of worry OSS-Fuzz would find the backdoor as people have speculated.
Fuzzing isn't really the best tool for catching bugs the maintainer intentionally inserted though.
I work on OSS-Fuzz.
As far as I can tell, the author's PRs do not compromise OSS-Fuzz in any way.
OSS-Fuzz doesn't trust user code for this very reason.
ClusterFuzzLite: Continuous Fuzzing for All
FuzzBench: Fuzzer Benchmarking as a Service
I find it a really cool idea, but for now, running fuzzers natively on Google Cloud with ClusterFuzz (https://github.com/google/clusterfuzz) suits our needs.
One challenge for the WASM approach is it will always be at least as hard to build a project for WASM as it is for native.
It's also worth pointing out that Mozilla made a (non-WASM) distributed fuzzing project, virgo: https://github.com/MozillaSecurity/virgo but it appears to be inactive.
But in general, I agree a lot of the bugs in WASM apps could be found by fuzzing their native versions.
ClusterFuzz is infrastructure for running fuzzers, so we use it to run AFL, libFuzzer, and other domain specific fuzzers we've written.
Using it to run AFL gives us a lot of nice things over using AFL on someone's desktop (such as crash deduplication, automatic issue filing, fixed testing, regression ranges etc.)
Guido's bignum fuzzer which tests the correctness of math operations in crypto libraries is one of the most interesting fuzzers we run on ClusterFuzz.
For now, you can actually do the fuzzing on prem while communicating with app engine. We do this for our OS X bots since GCE doesn't offer OS X.
But I think the kinds of bugs found by fuzzing aren't generally security issues in go (I don't know much about go) as they are in C/C++.
EDIT: See guidovranken's excellent sibling comment for how fuzzing can still be useful for go.
I can speak a little bit about what motivated us.
We saw from OSS-Fuzz (https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz) that this sort of thing could be widely useful and wanted non-open source code to benefit from making fuzzing easier.
But solidity was recently added to OSS-Fuzz: https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/soli...
Web apps, almost certainly no.
ClusterFuzz (and fuzzing generally) is most useful for finding bugs in C/C++ code so maybe it could work for unity games? I don't know much about them though.