matheus23
That said, this was an old blog post that never actually got finished, so we've taken it offline and replaced it with a redirect to our relay docs page.
If you look at Wireguard traffic, you'll see a <EndpointID>.iroh.invalid SNI in the QUIC Initial packet.
Encrypted ClientHello can fix that, but support hasn't shipped into rustls yet. So it's definitely fixable.
The interesting thing is that the ClientHello is undetectable when it's sent via the relay transport (sent inside a WSS connection). And in that case, any traffic that happens on IP is fully encrypted and can't be categorized.
About tailscale: It's similar, but iroh is not a VPN, so it doesn't add a TUN interface. Instead, you'd build iroh directly into your application. Using iroh you can build a VPN, and there are projects that do so (iroh-lan/iroh-vpn are some hobbyist projects). The upside of building it into your application is that it doesn't need special permissions and is easy to ship to the user.
The cool thing about noq (and Quinn, where we inherited this from), is that you can implement your own "Session" trait. So that can be either TLS or nQUIC.
> Or is the relayed QUIC wrapped in different protocol?
Yes, that's what's happening.
On the iroh/iroh-relay side, we implement this relaying using WebSockets. The datagrams are wrapped with a header saying which EndpointId (ed25519 public key) we want the packet to be relayed to. Because of a handshake between iroh clients and iroh relays, the relay knows and has authenticated the source EndpointId of datagrams it relays.
So yeah, we're tunneling QUIC datagrams through HTTPS over TCP (we encrypt twice). The relay really is just a fallback and for coordination. We specifically made these choices for maximum ubiquity for the fallback (not affected by UDP blocking, looks like "normal" traffic).