malay
Silicon Valley startup accelerators on the hunt for health-tech talent
Neither company cares about the comparison.
Our equity investment model is very similar to the YC/Start Fund relationship. KPCB, Mohr Davidow Ventures, and Mayo Clinic fund the companies we select with a $100,000 convertible note, at the same terms of an existing/pending seed round, or on flexible terms up to an uncapped note. We're different from YC in the sense that Rock Health itself takes no equity in the companies. We try to be extremely entrepreneur-friendly, and ultimately, the convertible note is entirely optional. For companies that don't want the note, we write non-dilutive grants up to $20,000.
In terms of whether we help our companies get funding (or not), our companies have raised more than $100M[1] from investors including Collaborative Fund, Felicis, First Round, Floodgate, Founders Collective, Founders Fund, General Catalyst, Khosla Ventures, NEA, The Social+Capital Partnership, SV Angel, True Ventures, and USVP, just to name a few (for context, our first cohort of companies finished at Rock Health in November 2011).
I'd love to connect with the community next time I'm in the Twin Cities. Send me an e-mail (in profile or malay@rockhealth).
Signs that Apple's creating a health wearable
A Clarification and an Apology
Rock Health-Backed Kit Check Nets $10.4M To Help Hospitals Reduce Costs
Rock Health's fifth class includes Google Glass for doctors
In case anyone else wanted to know where they read it, it's under Request for Startups, #3[2].
The ubiquitous computing plus sensor environment is making healthcare hardware startups the norm—we're seeing more and more applicants in this space at Rock Health. We don't think the FDA process is that onerous, and just published a report outlining the process for entrepreneurs who are new to the space.
Slides here: http://www.slideshare.net/jhammerb/20130206skillshare
Github repo here: https://github.com/hammer/personal-genome-analysis
Healthcare tech ideas we'd like to fund
Basically, if you are building any healthcare tools that could use administrative information from a health insurance company, you should probably be doing it on Eligible's platform.
Wearable device detects stress based on autonomic nervous system
Within Medicare, prescription drugs account for 11% of total Medicare expenditures and are projected to be 13.5% of total expenditures by 2021 [1].
Further, the prescription drug benefit ("Part D") has cost about 30% less than estimated by the CBO when the Medicare Modernization Act was passed (2003) [2]. This is due to a variety of factors, but a huge one has been lower-than-expected growth rates in per capita spending on prescription drugs, estimated at 4% per year since 2006 [2], much lower than overall growth in health spending.
[1] http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Stat...
Accenture was a rebrand of Andersen Consulting, the consulting division of Arthur Andersen, the large accountancy. The Big-5 accountancy gave them their entire brand position, so the creation of the Accenture logo involved all of the campaigns for them to emerge, not just the logo or mark. This is also why their ads are in every airport—the brand identify had to be built from scratch. For Accenture, it ended up being exceptional timing, considering the Enron scandal would emerge in a year or so and end up destroying Arthur Andersen.
Most of the accountancies examined spinning out their consulting divisions, similar to Accenture. I wouldn't say the results were as successful as Accenture for those that chose to rebrand. E&Y sold their group to Cap Gemini, becoming Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, and eventually just Capgemini. PwC was going to spin out their division as "Monday", but instead ended up selling the group to IBM (only to eventually restart again). KPMG had BearingPoint, which eventually went bankrupt. Deloitte contemplated rebranding their consulting group as Braxton, but it never happened.
All in all, seems like the $100M was worth it.
[1] http://www.fastcodesign.com/1662367/pwcs-mighty-morphin-logo...
Stripe is actually more like a new market disruption because it is bringing in non-consumers who might not have even been able to setup payment processing without their solution. The same is true of Gumroad, or Shopify.
[1] MIT Media Lab: http://media.mit.edu/research/groups/1448/openpds-privacy-pr...
[2] Personal: http://www.personal.com
This article was published in a week where the CEO of a major corporation admitted that he was completely wrong when he called concerns about his bank a "tempest in a teapot" just 4 weeks ago. He called his own company "sloppy" and "stupid" on national television.
And Ballmer is the worst CEO?
It is not possible to unlearn the information. If you are acting as a strategic advisor, the information has to weigh in your mind and you implicitly will end up revealing information, practically subconsciously. A simple case would be where one company explains an experiment they ran (perhaps testing a feature with a small part of their customer group) and the result of the experiment. If the competitive company comes in and says they are thinking of running a similar experiment and explicitly asks the advisors what they think—what is the response given?
I have a hard time understanding how this type of accumulated information could not enter into future judgments the advisors are making. As a management consultant who faces this type of challenge frequently (and overcomes it by avoiding competitive clients and never sharing my work) I am honestly curious how one elevates themselves above this type of subconscious thinking.
Traditional book retailers pay suppliers 90 days after the book enters inventory whereas Amazon averaged about 58 days. The problem for traditional retailers is they held books in inventory (i.e. the book went unsold) for an average of 167 days versus Amazon's 16 days. This resulted in retailers carrying the cost of the book for ~78 days while Amazon was able to hold the float for ~41 days.
The end result of that type of inversion is that Amazon can accept a much lower margin, earn the float on the cash and live off much faster inventory turns than a traditional retailer. This was much more brilliant than "disintermediation" - as another poster has correctly noted, Amazon was an aggregator/replacement, not a true disintermediator.
They will likely generate another $50B in cash this calendar year. Even if they want to maintain the $100B war chest, they could pay out ~$50/share/year. I think a share repurchase or dividend (whatever they think will return more value to the shareholders) is highly likely.