lprincehouse

Unfortunately our literature review didn't turn up Tahoe-LAFS when we wrote RACS, possibly because of differing terminology. It would have made a great addition to our related work section. I think the two systems are sufficiently different in design and aims, despite some similarities architecture.

One of the authors of RACS here. Indeed, the architecture of RACS is quite similar to Tahoe-LAFS, with a proxy server that sends shares of data to different cloud providers. With RACS, we focused on fault tolerance rather than malicious modification of data: Cloud providers have their own internal redundancy, so they (hopefully) protect their users from low-level hardware failures... but a company itself can fail, or even raise prices suddenly which can lead to an "economic failure", where the user's application becomes prohibitively expensive to run. So RACS is intended to protect against things like this. It can tolerate malicious modification of data shares on individual cloud providers, but that kind of security wasn't our focus, so it's interesting to see that Tahoe-LAFS takes that direction.