News for hackers. Stuff that matters.

libeclipse

Re:Noun Project – Icons for Everything on Friday May 12, 2017 @12:26PM (#14325360)
This site is sick.

I mainly use it for finding nice logos for my github projects, and they really do not disappoint.

Re:Collecting huge amounts of data with WhatsApp on Friday May 12, 2017 @06:49AM (#14322844)
My point is that there's probably an API call to get it.

Or is it sent by the client itself?

Re:Collecting huge amounts of data with WhatsApp on Friday May 12, 2017 @06:26AM (#14322759)
This could be extended slightly to get usernames, I believe.

When you're added to a group with a person in it who's not in your contacts, their messages have the name linked to their account in the corner.

> But I’d rather see Apple make me enter the PIN if it’s idle for one hour.

Does this ever really happen though? It's rare for my phone to sit there for more than 15 minutes without me messing with it.

The very fact that the government invests substantially in brute-forcing encryption means that there are enough weak implementations to make it worthwhile.

Food for thought.

Would be interesting to calculate

  P(actual_value_is_near_N | prediction_is_N).
What's the point of hiding the identity of the company here? The issue has apparently been fixed and I'd rather know which company had it so that I can avoid them.
Is there something like this available commercially, or at least a guide on making one with a Pi?

I suppose reading the paper is one option.

EDIT: Link to the paper seems to be broken. Here's the PDF: http://www.cs.vu.nl/~ast/Publications/Papers/lisa-2006.pdf

Re:Keylogger in Hewlett-Packard Audio Driver on Thursday May 11, 2017 @06:19AM (#14315005)
Unlikely. Normal consumers simply don't care, unfortunately.
> Younger programmers, please, start caring about your hands as early as possible!

How?

Re:Shell made a film about climate change in 1991 on Monday May 08, 2017 @02:57AM (#14289761)
Isn't that the whole point of the catalytic converter?
That's not what I'm saying. I'm talking about how teenagers can build systems resilient against these attacks, not that they carry out the attacks themselves. (Although I conjecture that a significant proportion of these attacks are also carried out by teenagers.)
I didn't mean to imply that the system itself would be setup at home.

My point is that loads of kids have the knowledge and common sense to create something that would be more secure against attacks than many professional, corporate or political systems.

If you look into most high-profile hacks, you see that their opsec and security practices were weak.

You don't see Amazon or Stripe being hacked all the time, and they are certainly large enough targets.

Sorry, your point may be valid but I don't see how it relates to my comment.
Re:Handling bot attacks against a Tor hidden service on Saturday May 06, 2017 @11:49AM (#14280753)
Did anyone else get a notification to install that site's certificate?

It's a strange technique.

I wonder if by "hacking" they mean social engineering.
It's scary to think that a teenager at home could setup something more resilient to attack than many of these important systems.

Like wow.

I'm skeptical, but unsurprised. Did you eliminate all other factors? Bugs on the client/server side?

When you do this write-up, or if you need any help with it, pop me an email (awn#cryptolosophy.io).

Is it possible to organise something like this in the UK? I would donate readily.
> Not to mention the random SSL downgrades that happen when you're going via UK transit links. (Which I have experienced myself!)

I live in the UK and have never experienced this. Could you provide a source? I don't think that is something that's happening.

She isn't bound legally by it.
Rather that than attack the straw man.
If you disagree with someone, the right thing to do is to put forward your own side of the argument. It isn't polite to simply disregard what someone says because of your conceptions about where that belief is coming from.
No I mean I understand where OTP falls short, but you're either really bad at conveying your viewpoint, or you're simply plain wrong.

Yes, with OTP you need to exchange keys and this shifts all of the security to key exchange, and while this wouldn't be a problem in other ciphers, it's a problem in OTP because of its other properties and shortfalls.

So at most I feel as though it's a security/convenience tradeoff; a tradeoff that's substantial or even dangerous in certain situations.

> means all of your security is in the key

...erm, isn't that the point?

Imagine implementing your amazing solution in real life.

I don't see a situation being frequent where you'd know the message weeks or months in advance of when you send it. If we follow your scheme, there's no encryption; we just meet up when we need to communicate. What if we're on opposite sides of the earth? If we had exchanged keys months earlier, this wouldn't be a problem.

You're absolutely right. Encryption is either strong for everyone all of the time, or it isn't.
Or terrorists could simply use open source, secure solutions and ignore the backdoored implementations.

Citizens lose.

I did my Extended Project Qualification (EPQ) [1] on this issue, and it actually surprised me how many people think that the governments are right in this debate.

When presenting the work, I had a chance to ask ordinary people, and they all pretty much agreed that the government should be able to "break" encryption with a warrant.

This is a scary prospect, and I feel that educating citizens as well as the government is important.

[1] https://github.com/libeclipse/EPQ/blob/master/paper.pdf

Older »