justcommenting
Disenshittify or die How hackers can seize the means of computation – Doctorow [video]
Michael Bazzell's Irish Exit
Tor Project Board Member is CEO of Company Selling Capability for Attribution
Covid's Cassandra: The Swift, Complicated Rise of Eric Feigl-Ding
Further analysis of the impact of distancing upon the Covid-19 pandemic – djb [pdf]
WSJ: India Wants Access to Encrypted WhatsApp Messages
What Are Skype Private Conversations?
Amazon to Raise Its Minimum U.S. Wage to $15 an Hour
Encrypted profiles for Signal now in public beta
The Grugq – American Snoper: The truth will not set you free
J.D. Vance: Why I’m Moving Home
I suspect inequality and wealth transfer explains much more of the observed trends than the author acknowledges at the end. In each of the verticals discussed, there have been strong (albeit sometimes less obvious) trends for consolidation among institutions and organizations. This includes companies, government contractors, and even vendors in ecosystems we tend to think of as decentralized like local schools, where significant consolidation might be occurring over time at the level of food suppliers like Aramark, utility companies, or diesel fuel suppliers for school buses.
These organizations' compensation and capital structures, in turn, likely grew increasingly unequal over time. Stockholders, stakeholders like executives, and intermediaries like insurance companies in those organizations likely extracted more and more capital relative to traditional stakeholders like the college students, physicians, and teachers addressed in the post.
Wealth transfer from traditional stakeholders (college students, physicians, teachers) to organizational stakeholders (execs, stockholders, suppliers in consolidating markets) seems like both a cause and a consequence of the 'cost disease' discussed in the post.
NSA-leaking Shadow Brokers lob Molotov cocktail before exiting world stage
Gladwell's uninformed gee-whiz speculation seems like an excuse to parrot the claim that Snowden "may have been the dupe of a foreign-intelligence service" without mentioning any evidence or even a clear argument beyond its appearance in a book. Maybe Snowden was that or worse, but the only argument Gladwell seems to construct to support the claim is that he was a dupe/fool because he didn't go Harvard like Ellsberg.
Another potentially self-serving issue that Gladwell conveniently glosses over in this piece: We could also make the argument that Ellsberg also had a much more effective and courageous press and educated population behind him. But it's easier to smear community college drop-outs and discuss a hypothetical "Edward Snowberg" than a hypothetical New Yorker with more reporters like Jane Mayer than commentators like Gladwell.
My argument was that Gladwell is painting a cheap caricature of a "hacker" when it's both easy and reasonable to interpret a quote like the one above in the broader context of the full speech/event and the dozens of others that he's given in recent years.
I'm not trying to argue that Snowden has or doesn't have respect for governing institutions. I think that's Snowden's story to tell. But my read of the piece is that Gladwell reached some "clever" sounding conclusion - perhaps in a "blink" - and then found a quote that supported his narrative, which reads more like Harvard-worship in Ellsberg's favor than careful presentation of arguments/evidence. This strikes me as misleading and dishonest in light of the sheer volume of interviews, tweets, etc. from Snowden that (at least to me) paint a more nuanced and careful picture.
Both were imperfect people in unique situations, but Gladwell's distinction seems to boil down to "Harvard, game theory, & Nobel prize winning PhD advisor" in the case of Ellsberg vs. "community-college dropout" in the case of Snowden, followed by Gladwell falling over himself to redefine "insider" right after spelling it out in detail with the language of class, prestige, and societal privilege.
I don't think Gladwell understands enough about either person - or "leaks" in general - to draw meaningful conclusions.
Gladwell's process serves well enough as a lazy caricature for the piece but doesn't represent a good-faith articulation of his subject's views, which is hard to excuse in light of the dozens of events, thousands of tweets, etc. that are much more accessible than Ellsberg material was decades ago.
Gladwell could have interviewed Snowden and Ellsberg but probably chose not to, perhaps because it was easier to trash-talk someone whose life is under threat at an especially sensitive time (pardon consideration) for a "clever" contrast with Ellsberg than to try to represent his perspective in good faith.
NSA SKIDROWE program
National Security Agency Said to Use Manhattan Tower as Listening Post
Spy Tech 'Hacks WhatsApp Encrypted Chat from a Backpack'
The Defense Department Wants to Spin Off the NSA
I'm surprised Appelbaum hasn't been directly suggested as a potential source[1,2].
[0] https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/75812/the-equation-giv...
[1] http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/12661/what-could-l...
[2] http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/01/jacob-appelbaum-30c3-...
For example, by what definition would this not be 'safe'? Do you mean in comparison to Firefox's defaults, which enable profoundly privacy-invasive tracking, hide the contents of the cookie management dialog box, and enable the delivery of malvertising at will by visiting "safe" websites - just to name a few?
MitM positions exist on the internet for all users today, both for HTTP and in the situation of "new HTTPS bugs". So you point out risks taken when using the internet in general, and the Tor Browser Bundle already mitigates many of those risks via NoScript and various patches. I've used Tor Browser Bundle daily for all purposes - including online banking and shopping - for several years with zero problems. Malicious exits exist and get flagged out of the network rapidly. Essentially all remaining risk is trivially defeated by toggling the 'block all unencrypted requests' pref in HTTPSEverywhere, which is part of the Tor Browser Bundle and could be built into an implementation in Firefox with a warning for HTTP traffic.
And you're probably thinking of 2009-era Tor network experience. For me, Tor network performance routinely boils down to ~200ms additional latency with ~1.5-2MB/s download speeds. The difference between that and an average broadband connection is barely noticeable.
I recommend using the Tor network and the Tor Browser Bundle before criticizing this idea.