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hellking4u

Re:Use Clean Energy Charging on Your iPhone on Monday July 03, 2023 @02:37PM (#36577127)
Doesn't Apple repair the M1 Macbooks if you take it to the Apple Store? From what I've understood, the macbook repairability issue is more to do with Apple's pricing and self-repair than the device becoming e-waste.

Apple also, I think, offers trade-in for the devices, recycling the components and preventing them from becoming e-waste if the device is a total loss.

Re:Blender 2.90 on Monday August 31, 2020 @04:56PM (#24335846)
Thank you for replying. This assuages my concerns behind Embree and OIDN.

I guess I just get suspicious whenever I see MKL mentioned.

Re:Blender 2.90 on Monday August 31, 2020 @02:54PM (#24334735)
From the oneDNN documentation[1]: > The library is optimized for Intel Architecture Processors, Intel Processor Graphics and Xe architecture-based Graphics.

Now, whether "optimized" means tuned for Intel architecture, or crippled for other architecture, is something to be figured out. Given the precedent set by MKL, I wouldn't trust it to be the 'tuned' option. Someone who speaks C++ may be able to better discern if such concerns exist with one-dnn.

[1] https://github.com/oneapi-src/oneDNN

Re:Blender 2.90 on Monday August 31, 2020 @02:18PM (#24334317)
This is great, but I have to say, I'm a bit concerned about multiple Intel tools (Embree, OpenImageDenoise) that are now integrated into Blender. The tools seem to depend on Intel MKL, which has famously been crippled on non Intel CPUs.

The big concern, for me, is the wide usage of Blender in common CPU benchmarks, which potentially could give Intel an unfair advantage in those.

Security through Obscurity is just not a great way of going about it. NIST notes "System security should not depend on the secrecy of the implementation or its components."[1]

Kerckhoffs's principle is also a relevant read.

As professor Bellovin notes :

"It helps, I think, to go back to Kerckhoffs' second principle, translated as "The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble," per http://petitcolas.net/fabien/kerckhoffs/). Kerckhoffs said neither "publish everything" nor "keep everything secret"; rather, he said that the system should still be secure even if the enemy has a copy."

[1] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-123/SP800-123...