groupmonoid

This really needs to be done. The journalist's article has nothing to do with the paper (I do not think the journalist read the paper)

To add to your point:

> Google lets you set up simple Firewall rules. Amazon gives you VPC, security groups, network access control lists and a big, fat headache.

AWS also gives you firewall rules, in addition to the other options. If you don't get why you would need them, you don't really have to use them.

That is about an unrelated paper

You're right. Death rate is about 0.8%, to be compared to 0.02% here (40 times less). Of course, this does not account for the difference in the age distribution of workers vs the national population.

At high level chess (which this is), white has a significant advantage over black. Always picking asm.js as white (and not providing a setting to change it) is a bit disingenuous.

By looking at the IBM-provided benchmarks, it looks like the new Power8 is better. But are there any independent benchmarks out there already?

Where can I register as a locksmith, and what's my cut?

This paper just received the $100,000 Internet Defense Prize from Facebook at USENIX Security ’15

My heart wants to agree with Thomas, but I think we should remember this is a single data point and not generalize too hastily.

Are you sure about that? https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/c...

Abstract from the pdf:

Software security practitioners are often torn between choosing performance or security. In particular, OS kernels are sensitive to the smallest performance regressions. This makes it difficult to develop innovative kernel hardening mechanisms: they may inevitably incur some run-time performance overhead. Here, we propose building kernel function with and without hardening, within a single split kernel. In particular, this allows trusted processes to be run under unmodified kernel code, while system calls of untrusted processes are directed to the hardened kernel code. We show such trusted processes run with no overhead when compared to an unmodified kernel. This allows deferring the decision of making use of hardening to the run-time. This means kernel distributors, system administrators and users can selectively enable hardening according to their needs: we give examples of such cases. Although this approach cannot be directly applied to arbitrary kernel hardening mechanisms, we show cases where it can. Finally, our implementation in the Linux kernel requires few changes to the kernel sources and no application source changes. Thus, it is both maintainable and easy to use.