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gquere

Re:EMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise on Friday October 23, 2026 @03:15AM (#50205458)
> Even if they would monitor, they couldn't because some logs handle many certs but rate limit you so you couldn't catch up if you tried.

I wasn't aware of that, I know of a few teams that do this internally and seemingly have no problems, I'll ask them next time I get a chance. Thanks for your answer.

Re:eMudhra to Exit Global SSL/TLS Certificate Business on Thursday October 22, 2026 @12:13PM (#50197384)
Their OTP solution is bruteforceable as well: https://mastodon.catgirl.cloud/@49016/117475921584308861
Re:EMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise on Thursday October 22, 2026 @03:05AM (#50192139)
"It doesn't solve anything because they don't monitor the logs" feels like a completely different thing than "It doesn't solve anything".
Re:EMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @09:01AM (#50180206)
Certificate Transparency solves the rogue CA scenario for domain owners.
Re:EMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @08:37AM (#50179876)
Wiping local app storage fixes this.
Doesn't ACME+CT solve this threat?
There's a beginning of an explanation in the mozilla bugrepor thttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449
Re:An Interesting Find: STM32 RDP1 Decryptor on Tuesday March 03, 2026 @02:29AM (#47229304)
RDP2 has been cracked by glitching. You first need to downgrade RDP2 to RDP1 then do the RDP1 bootloader glitch. It's not exactly easy but it's well documented and can be done given enough time. Though the STM32F4 targets do have a high chance of bricking during this attack.
Re:An Interesting Find: STM32 RDP1 Decryptor on Tuesday March 03, 2026 @02:27AM (#47229285)
First I'd like to point out that "Decryptor" is an ill-chosen term: there's no encryption mechanism here, RDP is a software lock based on an internal flash state.

This dongle is very likely to be this original attack https://github.com/JohannesObermaier/f103-analysis/tree/mast... but now packaged. If you want to read more this repo has the best doc: https://github.com/CTXz/stm32f1-picopwner. It's a multi-step attack where a payload is executed from persisted SRAM (RDP1 means you can read/write to it) after a quick reset. The fact that they mention freezing the chip heavily weighs in that direction since it's needed for higher clock chips.

I've tried this locally on a known-vulnerable piece of software using the hugginface Q8 model + llama. It did find the vuln when given the entrypoint in the lib and user-controlled buffer. Otherwise it produced false positives.
AFAIK you don't need a credit card linked to the account, you can get in-store credit from selling the guaranteed drop items from playing a few matches, this is enough to get you started trading.
Read up on the story, look at the influencers promoting it and the ecosystem that grew around it. Valve is willfully running a casino for underage and have bypassed local laws that protect against this using technicalities. It's frightening.
I didn't downvote you (my account is low reputation) but your argument is weak: that some skins go for absurd amount of money says nothing of the rest of the ecosystem. There can both be children and drug dealers (ab)using the same "gaming" mechanics.
They're running an online casino directed at children and have made specific adaptations to bypass legal regulations in several countries.
They did this to take a bigger cut of the market because most trades happened off-platform. This new update ensures that they will sell more of their new items through their shop (contract cases) because it's going to be the only way to get the red items to fuses into "valuable" knives. They're rotten to the core.
Look at the "meta-"game mechanics: you play a few games, you get a guaranteed case drop. This circa $3 case could contain anything, a $0.2 skin or a rare $2500 knife. When you open it a casino-like wheel goes over all the items and selects one randomly. There are hundreds of YT/twitch channels that open cases all day long and their target audience is children. It's gambling, and it's gambling for children.
I doubt it's going to change anything, this manipulated market will adapt and continue to extract money from kids. The cynic in me could even say that this change was pushed by Valve to take a bigger cut of the skin market (most trades are supervised by 3d parties). Coffeezilla investigated one of the many casino sites, there's a lot more to it.
It doesn't "feel" like gambling, it's straight 100% the exact same thing but it's designed in a way that bypasses the legal words.
Re:Dumping Memory to Bypass BitLocker on Windows 11 on Friday January 03, 2025 @05:31AM (#42584404)
On company laptops this isn't always true, for instance here's the spec sheet of the ThinkPad T14 (this seems to be true for all ThinkPad models): https://www.lenovo.com/fr/fr/p/laptops/thinkpad/thinkpadt/th...

Where it states: Module dTPM 2.0 (Discrete Trusted Platform Module)

Same for HP EliteBook and ProBooks: https://h20195.www2.hp.com/v2/GetPDF.aspx/c08049273.pdf

Re:Becoming physically immune to brute-force attacks (2021) on Monday October 28, 2024 @03:43AM (#41968605)
Technically bcrypt isn't a KDF.
There are already a bunch of studies showing that the ozempic causes massive muscle loss and lessens bone density. And before anyone remarks "just do resistance training", I doubt the people that take the easy solution will do it in conjunction.
Re:Attacking Unix Systems via Cups, Part I on Friday September 27, 2024 @03:52AM (#41667482)
On RHEL it's installed but it's not enabled by default.
Re:The CrowdStrike Failure Was a Warning on Monday July 22, 2024 @03:37AM (#41031786)
The article advocates for even more market fragmentation? Even though that isn't the issue at all?
There's supposedly a fix being deployed (https://x.com/George_Kurtz/status/1814235001745027317). Since it's a channel update I'm assuming that it would be downloaded automatically? Has anyone received it yet? Does the garbage driver disappear or is it replaced?
Re:Ask HN: What is in C-00000291*.sys? on Friday July 19, 2024 @08:00AM (#41005426)
Was there a way to not enable these channel updates? If so, would you still check all the mandatory security measures when being audited?
Re:Timeline of the xz open source attack on Tuesday April 02, 2024 @11:14AM (#39906666)
There totally is authenticated RCE, for instance a PHP page that contains a RCE but needs a prior authentication to access the resource.

All RCEs are classified in either unauthenticated or authenticated, the former being the worst (or best if you're a researcher/hacker).

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