fluentmundo
Here is the alternative model proposed by Skidelsky:
"These deep methodological issues do not render economic knowledge utterly useless, Skidelsky suggests. But they do mean economics as we know it may have to be thrown out. [...] We should instead take a more provisional, open, and flexible attitude toward economic phenomena and treat economics as (just) another social science, rather than one supposedly purified of uncertainty by its logical prowess. Concretely, this means we should abandon dreams of an immaculate science of economic life—and stop deferring to those who claim to speak in its name. More abstractly, in place of a discipline that neglects the 'mesoeconomic' level—the institutions, firms, unions, banking systems, social movements, digital platforms, states, and other social entities that shape our behavior—Skidelsky proposes an approach 'which is more modest in its epistemology and richer in its ontology.'"
"All the same, her title cannot help but evoke other, perhaps more frightening monsters—ecological breakdown, deadly pandemics, secular stagnation, rising inequality, authoritarian resurgence—that her analysis relegates to the margins when it mentions them at all."
In the section on the book by Elizabeth Popp Berman, the author of the piece lays emphasis on the way the "economic style" has been involved in "downplaying, avoiding, exacerbating, and denying" dealing with carbon emissions:
"This was the first step in the marketization of pollution rights that ultimately led to cap-and-trade approaches to ozone regulation; economists would propose the very same approach to climate for years, leading to a spectacular failure of implementation in the United States and negligible impact on emissions in Europe to date. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently reiterated, the costs of this comprehensive failure have been staggering."
The author obviously thinks persuasion is “a two-way street,” that asking questions is good, and that Socratic dialogue leaves people more enlightened: it helps make their ignorance more precise.
Uh.... this completely misunderstands like literally everything Sartre wrote, the point of which was that you ALWAYS have a choice.
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Say you want to do basic linear regression: you want to estimate the slope for Y regressed on X. The most stringent form of inference works like this: you draw a random sample (X_i, Y_i), modeled as n independent and identically distributed realizations from the joint distribution (X,Y). Etc. This is certainly a stochastic model; we require randomization (or some approximation of it) to do inference. But it has nothing whatsoever to do with causality.
Your beef isn't with RCTs, or with the notion of RCT as evidence. Your beef is with researchers who don't know how to think.
Your complaint is like saying, we should stop considering hammers to be the gold-standard of nail-hitters because some idiots use them to try to turn screws.
Yes, randomization is central to classical statistics, but no, it is not inherently causal. Drawing a random sample from a bivariate distribution (X,Y) is key to doing a lot (though not all) of classical statistical inference (think of estimating slopes in regression), but the randomization does not imply anything about the causal relationship between X and Y. When you speak of randomization in the context of "treatment regimes," you are thinking about randomized controlled trials, which the piece does analyze explicitly, in some detail. So in this sense the account given in the essay is not misleading.