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etc_passwd

Re:Twitter open sourced the recommendation engine on Friday March 31, 2023 @03:54PM (#35392599)
Democrats / Republicans looks like it was added outside of SDLC [1]. This order without those features is sorted, likely by a linter, suggesting Elon and Vits are properly implemented, and Democrats/Republicans was just inserted alongside the Elon feature, perhaps just for this extract. Sorting it now results in a different order than the commit.

[1]: https://github.com/twitter/the-algorithm/blob/7f90d0ca342b92...

Re:All About E: The Language That Infiltrated JavaScript on Thursday October 27, 2022 @02:22AM (#33353878)
The security principle is largely based on OCAP-based permission scheme, where implicit access to an object is equal to the right to access, and freezing said object limits its use.
Re:All About E: The Language That Infiltrated JavaScript on Thursday October 27, 2022 @02:18AM (#33353849)
the ability to create and send an object that cannot be modified
Re:Go Module Mirror and Checksum Database Launched on Friday August 30, 2019 @12:46PM (#20840227)
if you read the blog post and the privacy policy, you’d see that they are collecting analytics and requests in logs, including failed private module lookups.
Re:Go Module Mirror and Checksum Database Launched on Friday August 30, 2019 @12:16PM (#20839982)
...but references to them are stored by google in logs and used per the privacy policy at https://proxy.golang.org/privacy
Re:WRT120N fprintf Stack Overflow on Tuesday February 18, 2014 @11:29PM (#7261793)
It's a Disassembler - Ida Pro

https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/

Re:JSFuck – Write any JavaScript with 6 Characters: []()!+ on Friday September 13, 2013 @06:58PM (#6383713)
Here are two more javascript encoders that are useful for getting around filters:

http://utf-8.jp/public/jjencode.html http://utf-8.jp/public/aaencode.html

Re:Breaking Hacker News's CSRF Protections on Friday July 26, 2013 @01:20AM (#6106745)
Your browser will automatically send any cookies it has for a domain when it is instructed to send a request to that domain HttpOnly cookies included. The thing preventing the malicious site from getting knowledge of your SID or your fnid token is the Same Origin Policy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same_origin_policy. If it wasn't for the same origin policy, I could just grab your HN sid from any website with plain JS on the malicious domain.

A CSRF attack is the equivalent of blind-firing a gun at a domain, and the browser "helps" you by automatically attaching your cookies to that bullet. Depending on the situation, you usually don't get a response back. Here is a good preso from when CSRF was hot back then which explains the attack scenarios: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/Willis/Prese...

Throwing CORS into the mix complicates things a bit but that relies on the site that is being attacked to explicitly allow calls from the malicious site or use an Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * which in itself is a security vulnerability. More details on CORS: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/HTTP/Access_control...

Re:Breaking Hacker News's CSRF Protections on Friday July 26, 2013 @12:19AM (#6106586)
CSRF tokens are designed to protect users from CSRF attacks from other sites. The example you posted requires the username and password, which renders the token anyways. A cross-domain post to HN from a rogue site will not be able to know the CSRF token since it does not have knowledge of your SID, rendering this attack not viable in practice.

More Info: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(...