davidcash
Trusting blockciphers over hashes based on this high-level argument is suspect, at least in principle. (To be clear, I'm not arguing with your practical recommendations as they seem pragmatically justified.) It could well be the case that the ways we build password hashes from blockciphers appear to be more secure simply because we haven't sufficiently cryptanalyzed blockciphers for the necessary collision-resistance-type properties. Perhaps collision resistance is just too much to hope from any highly-efficient function, and it is only a matter of investing the effort to find collisions in the functions derived from blockciphers. Adding to the suspicion is the fact that blockciphers give us good hashes by coincidence, not design (And formal evidence doesn't help explain the situation - although I see hand-wavy claims about related-key attack resistance being sufficient, in my work I've only found reverse connections).
So are you aware of any deeper reasoning behind the blockciphers-over-hashes argument? Could trusting blockciphers for collision-resistance just be a good usage of security-through-obscurity, because a tremendous amount of effort has been invested in finding collisions in the hash functions but not in the blockciphers?
Also, that paper was subsequently shown to be fatally flawed. http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.1264
Anyway, yeah, a theoretical diversion.
(Hi Dan?)