botanicalfriend
botanicalfriend on Hacker News
> The restrictive policy was designed with these goals in mind:
> 1. No bypass of security by executing programs via ld.so.
> 2. Anything requesting execution must be trusted.
One correction on the table: SELinux and AppArmor shouldn't be grouped under "rename-resistant: No". AppArmor is path-based. SELinux labels are on the inode, a rename doesn't change the security context. The copy attack doesn't apply either: a process in sandbox_t creating a file in /tmp gets tmp_t via type transition, and the policy does not grant sandbox_t execute permission on tmp_t.
[1] https://github.com/linux-application-whitelisting/fapolicyd
Greg is pretty blunt about this in the video linked in the article: "If you are not using the latest stable / longterm kernel, your system is insecure" (see 51:40-53:00 in [1]). He also calls out Red Hat explicitly for ending up "off in the weeds" with their fixes.
RHEL as an entire distribution may provide good enough security for most environments. But that is not the same claim as "the RHEL kernel is secure" or "they know exactly which commits are relevant". It is still guesswork plus backports, and you're still running behind upstream fixes (many of which will never get pulled in). It is a comfortable myth.
I’d strongly recommend looking into msgspec. It is a much faster alternative and is largely “correct” in its implementation. It uses all of the python native type annotations without many hacks. Really it is much much faster and can actually be used for performance sensitive python workloads that need strong typing.
I've slowly transitioned from FF to Chrome over the past year, for this reason. I still use both, but am trying to prepare myself for a time that comes when FF is no longer a viable primary browser.
If you're paranoid you can use GPG + a smart card like a yubikey, but its all about convenience trade off..