acct-litter-zed

> To me a painted paroquet

> Hath been—a most familiar bird—

> Taught me my alphabet to say—

> To lisp my very earliest word

So Poe, "On Lisp"? :)

Apparently (I don't remember it, although I probably did read the Byte magazine at the time) there was a rumor in the early 1980s that IBM's PC was going to be a shrunken 370, called the 380. [1][2]

I wish IBM would shrink their LinuxONE Rockhopper 4 Rack Mount down to at least an "under the desktop" model. To my knowledge, IBM still makes quality products and has excellent customer service. They have fun names too (Rockhopper and Emperor are types of penguins!) and they even have 3D models of their rack mount cloud computers with shadows. [3] In fact, when I first read about Oxide a year or two, I searched for "IBM cloud server", and left it at that. So IBM, could you please send someone from the LinuxONE down to Boca Raton to create our new PC? :) Thanks!

P.S. I would even accept a shrunken 370. :)

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_Personal_Computer

[2] https://archive.org/details/byte-magazine-1981-01/page/n313/...

[3] https://www.ibm.com/demos/it-infrastructure/ux/product.html#...

I think 'throw-DO-178C' was being less literal than you are assuming here. Note that they quoted the comment about extremely high quality. What gives Hubris/Humility that level of quality?

When I see the concept of "extremely high quality" applied to software in the aerospace domain, I tend to think of methods like formal proofs and "semi-formal" methodologies like DO-178C (including MC/DC, not as a tool, but as a critical sub-process). It does appear that Humility adheres to some traditional ideas used in even "safety conscious", real-time embedded work:

> However, Hubris may be more interesting for what it doesn't have. There are no operations for creating or destroying tasks at runtime, no dynamic resource allocation, no driver code running in privileged mode, and no C code in the system. This removes, by construction, a lot of the attack surface normally present in similar systems. [1]

Oxide surely didn't invent all these concepts, we were applying some of this (using C) in the early '90s on human-safety-critical embedded projects, and they were most likely used before that. The attack surface eliminated is more than just security, e.g. even self-induced "attacks" from task priority inversion. Maybe the concept of applying them to rack mount servers is novel, but I have no experience there. Techniques like DO-178C go farther and do things like trace requirements to object code and strict coverage criteria.

When you are considering where Hubris/Humility might be applied in aerospace, also note that it would most likely be denied at the proposal stage of talking to a regulatory body like the FAA if you said, "The methodology for our brake controller is cloning a Github repo written by 100X S/W engineers in the Rust language, then modding that to fit." It's a process you have to follow in a documented fashion, from the start. Who knows--I certainly don't know everything--if you do have a identify reproducible process that improves S/W quality, the FAA might be interested.

And as far as eliminating debuggers goes, Boeing did actually do a joint academic/industry project on a zero-bug reduced (subset) Ada compiler (Zbra), which itself would be qualified as a tool instead of the more laborious process of mapping requirements to object code directly. [2]

In the spirit of humor shown on this topic, I would suggest considering a reduced subset of Rust called Iron. :) Regards, and best of luck!

[1] https://oxidecomputer.github.io/hubris/

[2] http://www.sigada.org/conf/sigada2002/SIGAda2002-CDROM/SIGAd...