Ristovski
Is this not simply some sort of watermark instead of an artifact?
> Improper validation in a model specific register (MSR) could allow a malicious program with ring0 access to modify SMM configuration while SMI lock is enabled, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. [0]
[0]: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/a...
The Github repo[0] disagrees: > NVTOP stands for Neat Videocard TOP, a (h)top like task monitor for GPUs and accelerators.
I have been using this on AMD for a long time now.
The HLOS (High-level OS) running on the Hexagon requires every "applet" to be signed by either the Qualcomm root cert or the OEMs cert. Usually, every phone has a set of generic Hexagon applets (or "skeleton libs") that are provided and signed by the OEM, which seem to be freely usable to offload some computational work to the DSP (mainly FastCV et al - https://developer.qualcomm.com/sites/default/files/docs/qual...). Those of course come with their own bugs: https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/pwn2own-qualcomm-dsp/
On some older SoCs, you were able to use a TOCTOU (Time of check to time of use) exploit to bypass the signature check by patching the applet loader shim in-memory, once it itself got authenticated: https://github.com/geohot/freethedsp/ (I have personally ported this to the msm8953, and it seems to work)
VanJS (Vanilla JavaScript) – A 1.2kB Reactive UI Framework Without React/JSX
iTLB Multihit
Here is an interesting paper about Computrace: https://www.coresecurity.com/sites/default/files/private-fil...
> My theory is that fixing the Spectre V2 vulnerability on a hardware level would lead to fundamental architecture changes that AMD is not willing to make, because it may add so much more complexity to the architecture or it may just be too unconvenient. They probably realized that optimizing the code paths that the Linux kernel utilizes on the default mitigations mode is faster, simpler and it may involve less deeper changes, while still being secure.
> As far as I know, pretty much every CPU architecture that implements speculative execution is vulnerable to some version of Spectre, so note that this is not a fundametal flaw of AMD64.
Or is it so low power that it can use some sort of piezoelectric/MEMS power source that charges it as the wheel is spinning?
Example: https://github.com/UCYT5040/Google-Sticker-Mashup-Research/b...
Edit: 6: https://github.com/UCYT5040/Google-Sticker-Mashup-Research/b...
As a matter of fact, they implemented their own hot-reload functionality themselves [0][1].
[0] - https://twitter.com/JetBrainsRider/status/145148793146664961... [1] - https://www.jetbrains.com/rider/nextversion/
"We're noticing an elevated level of usage for the time of day and are currently monitoring the performance of our systems. We do not anticipate this resulting in any impact to the service.
We have temporarily disabled typing notifications. We expect these to be re-enabled soon."
I think Googles spam detection is a bit too much lax when the sender itself is using gmail.
These might as well be hacked accounts which have already proven themselves to be valid and "human" at a previous point in time? I doubt gmails spam detection would let a brand new account spam CC'd emails without any sort of detection.
It is offline - meaning you download the areas you are interested in first, after which all the data is available fully offline (including stuff like directions, metro maps etc). The interface takes a bit to get used to, but the biggest let down is the fact that you can't edit a route in the route planner - you need to start all over again (selecting start/destination, no way to modify either).
[0] - https://f-droid.org/en/packages/app.organicmaps/ (also available on Play Store)
It also mentions "training" and more advanced processing (which would be ideal for the Qualcomm Hexagon DSP, shame it's practically unused on non-Pixel phones).
[0] https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/cc/ee/a2/e631f84...
I would say that the possibility is there - imagine a buffer overflow (or something as bad) in the driver running in the kernel.
However, getting the malicious firmware onto the MCU would be the difficult part. But I suppose even a purposefully "bad" batch of MCUs that have an extra core executing malicious code is not exactly science fiction in these times :P
> could be hard fault handler getting invoked due to either div by 0 or incorrect linkage
Interesting! I will look into this, cheers.
> Great write-up BTW - subscribe!
Thank you, much appreciated!