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> German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s centre-left coalition agreed to “evaluate” a tax on internet platforms in its treaty signed in early May, agreeing that the proceeds should be used to strengthen the country’s media landscape.

Not sure in what world Merz's coalition could ever be considered centre-left. It's a coalition of the conservative party (which moved much further right under his leadership) and the centrist Social Democrats (who equally moved to the right/center under current and former leadership). Calling them "centre-right" could perhaps be acceptable, all while "conservative" is also a widespread label.

Can you specify ? The default heavy reliance on Reddit and YouTube, rather than trusted publications (e.g. Scientific American, NYTimes) and scientific publications, is worrying given widespread misinformation in certain scientific fields (e.g. nutrition, health, economics)

That's exactly my point! Take the train to Zurich, then fly out of there and you'll get both a better experience and emit less carbon

> My 55-minute flight from Geneva to Zurich didn't land on its first attempt.

I know this is not the point of the article but why would you take a flight from Geneva to Zurich? It's less than 3h by train, which if you count the time it takes to get to Geneva airport and go through security, probably becomes a much smaller difference.

And for that, you're emitting ~100kg of CO2 [1]

[1]: https://curb6.com/footprint/flights/geneva-gva/zurich-zrh

The idea is pretty easy: If an employer could simply ask you about past union activity (or activity indicating it, such as certain training) and then fire you for lying about your employment history when you omit it, then the protection for unions is effectively neutralized.

Unlike what other commentators imply, this judgment doesn't legitimize just inventing degrees or qualifications. It's closer to omitting that 2-month job that didn't work out

> Speaking of international laws of combat: no protections apply to non-uniformed combatants pretending to be civilians. None. They can be tortured, executed on the spot, whatever.

Speaking of "armchair international law experts", this is completely wrong.

BLUF: Failing to distinguish does not deprive you of fundamental guarantees of humane treatment, including the prohibition of torture and summary execution - both of which are war crimes.

The individual obligation to distinguish is linked to Prisoner of War (POW) status - those who do not distinguish, do not get the protections of that status. That is the only consequence of the failure to distinguish. All those persons who are not POWs are automatically civilians, as made clear by the residual clause in Article 4(4) Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV). While civilians can be interned for "imperative reasons of security", they are entitled to their own detailed treatment obligations (Articles 79-135 GC IV). In any case, even if they are somehow not entitled to that treatment, the fundamental humane treatment guarantees of Art 27 GC IV [1] and Art 75 Additional Protocol I [2] (which, as customary law, applies to all parties to a conflict) nonetheless apply. If we argue that it is a non-international armed conflict (which knows neither POW status nor the obligation to distinguish), Common Article 3 [3] similarly obligates humane treatment. Humane treatment is also a norm under customary law [4].

Under these rules, you cannot torture people and you cannot summarily execute people [4]. Read the provisions yourself. In fact, summary execution and torture are actual war crimes [5]. If you want to punish a person, you need to give them a fair trial (IHL does not prohibit the death penalty).

You seem to be hinting at the Bush-era "illegal enemy combatant" theory but even the Bush Admin never argued that those persons are not entitled to humane treatment (it was mostly about fair trial rights), and the US (as its lone defender) has long since abandoned the position.

Whether Hamas is actually subject to such an obligation to distinguish is highly controversial. On one level is the issue of conflict classification, since POW status and the obligation to distinguish only exist in the law of international armed conflict (IAC). If we accept that there is an IAC (e.g. because of the military occupation), then the question still arises if Hamas somehow "belongs" to the State of Palestine or if they should just be seen as civilians directly participating in hostilities or as being in a parallel non-international armed conflict between Hamas and Israel. In turn, if we accept that there is an obligation to distinguish applicable to Hamas, then Israel also needs to treat Hamas fighters that distinguished as POWs (and, as set out above, if they failed to distinguish, as civilians).

[1]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/art...

[2]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/arti...

[3]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/art...

[4]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule87 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule89 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule90

[5]: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule156

I did not assert that it would be legally binding. However, it is considered to be quite authoritative by lawyers, including military lawyers. The two most controversial parts concern the idea of "continuous combatant function" to define members of an armed group, which some want to see defined more narrowly or more broadly (latter: US), and recommendation IX. However, the criteria for direct participation on hostilities are widely accepted as the authoritative interpretation by States and scholars of that term in the Geneva Conventions.

Of course, the document itself would not make a statement on its authoritative nature since, despite the broad consultation with experts, they cannot predict the wider reaction.

Exactly! The key difference is that the worker still count as civilians in the calculus that considers whether an attack is proportional (anticipated military advantage vs expected civilian effects) and whether the attacker took all feasible precautions to avoid and minimize civilian loss, including attacking at night, using tailored weaponry, giving a warning, …

That has nothing to do with your original statement. Yes, hospital can lose their special protection but must then be given a warning that gives them enough time to evacuate and only if that warning is unheeded, it loses special protection. But all the other rules protecting civilians still apply (distinction, proportionality, precautions, …). In any case, this has nothing to do with the whole civilian population being stripped of their protections. They still have their human rights and cannot be targeted.

While the DPH Guidance has it's controversial parts (Rec IX), the guidance on interpreting "directly participating in hostilities" is quite authoritative.

And that should be emphasized: the Geneva Conventions allow the targeting of military objectives, combatants (i.e. members of armed forces) and "civilians directly participating in hostilities". The Guidance just interprets the latter and arguably widens the scope, because - without the invention of "continuous combatant function" - you could attack e.g. members of Hamas' armed wing during an attack and in preparation of one. Now you can attack them at any time.

You can target the manufacturing plants since they are military objectives but you cannot target the workers. If any war-sustaining activity would make you, as a person, a target, pretty much anyone could be bombed: farmers, bankers, power plant engineers, truck drivers, ...

For a source, you can check out the Red Cross document I linked. Specifically, Ctrl+F for "continuous combat function" and read the commentary on recommendation V. The Guidance is considered authoritative in legal circles.

Years ago, scholars (such as Didier Bigo) have already raised concerns about the targeting of individuals merely based on (indirect) association with a "terrorist" or "criminal". Originally used in the context of surveillance (see Snowden revelations), such systems would target anyone who would be e.g. less than 3-steps away from an identified individual, thereby removing any sense of due process or targeted surveillance. Now, such AI systems are being used to actually kill people - instead of just surveil.

IHL actually prohibits the killing of persons who are not combatants or "fighters" of an armed group. Only those who have the "continuous function" to "directly participate in hostilities"[1] may be targeted for attack at any time. Everyone else is a civilian that can only be directly targeted when and for as long as they directly participate in hostilities, such as by taking up arms, planning military operations, laying down mines, etc.

That is, only members of the armed wing of Hamas (not recruiters, weapon manufacturers, propagandists, financiers, …) can be targeted for attack - all the others must be arrested and/or tried. Otherwise, the allowed list of targets of civilians gets so wide than in any regular war, pretty much any civilian could get targeted, such as the bank employee whose company has provided loans to the armed forces.

Lavender is so scary because it enables Israel's mass targeting of people who are protected against attack by international law, providing a flimsy (political but not legal) justification for their association with terrorists.

[1]: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990...

Relevant paras:

> (γ) Statutory requirement to decrypt communications

> 76. Lastly, as regards the requirement to submit to the security services information necessary to decrypt electronic communications if they are encrypted, the Court observes that international bodies have argued that encryption provides strong technical safeguards against unlawful access to the content of communications and has therefore been widely used as a means of protecting the right to respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence online. In the digital age, technical solutions for securing and protecting the privacy of electronic communications, including measures for encryption, contribute to ensuring the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression (see paragraphs 28 and 34 above). Encryption, moreover, appears to help citizens and businesses to defend themselves against abuses of information technologies, such as hacking, identity and personal data theft, fraud and the improper disclosure of confidential information. This should be given due consideration when assessing measures which may weaken encryption.

> 77. As noted above (see paragraph 57 above), it appears that in order to enable decryption of communications protected by end-to-end encryption, such as communications through Telegram’s “secret chats”, it would be necessary to weaken encryption for all users. These measures allegedly cannot be limited to specific individuals and would affect everyone indiscriminately, including individuals who pose no threat to a legitimate government interest. Weakening encryption by creating backdoors would apparently make it technically possible to perform routine, general and indiscriminate surveillance of personal electronic communications. Backdoors may also be exploited by criminal networks and would seriously compromise the security of all users’ electronic communications. The Court takes note of the dangers of restricting encryption described by many experts in the field (see, in particular, paragraphs 28 and 34 above).

> 78. The Court accepts that encryption can also be used by criminals, which may complicate criminal investigations (see Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, § 312, 26 September 2023). However, it takes note in this connection of the calls for alternative “solutions to decryption without weakening the protective mechanisms, both in legislation and through continuous technical evolution” (see, on the possibilities of alternative methods of investigation, the Joint Statement by Europol and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, cited in paragraph 33 above, and paragraph 24 of the Report on the right to privacy in the digital age by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, cited in paragraph 28 above; see also the explanation by third-party interveners in paragraph 47 above).

> 79. The Court concludes that in the present case the ICO’s statutory obligation to decrypt end-to-end encrypted communications risks amounting to a requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users; it is accordingly not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.

> (δ) Conclusion

> 80. The Court concludes from the foregoing that the contested legislation providing for the retention of all Internet communications of all users, the security services’ direct access to the data stored without adequate safeguards against abuse and the requirement to decrypt encrypted communications, as applied to end-to-end encrypted communications, cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. In so far as this legislation permits the public authorities to have access, on a generalised basis and without sufficient safeguards, to the content of electronic communications, it impairs the very essence of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention. The respondent State has therefore overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard.

> 81. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

Yes, that is very true. The Court generally does not oppose surveillance measures in general, as long as adequate safeguards are in place. However, I read the relevant paragraphs (paras 76-79) to be quite a strong rejection of any statutory obligation that would effectively require the installation of a backdoor undermining E2EE. The criticism of a lack of adequate safeguards and the risk of abuse is more focused on other aspects of the law.

That also becomes clear in the key paragraph 80: "The Court concludes from the foregoing that the contested legislation providing for the retention of all Internet communications of all users, the security services’ direct access to the data stored _without adequate safeguards against abuse_ and the _requirement to decrypt encrypted communications_, as applied to end-to-end encrypted communications, cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society"

The Court does not qualify the requirement to decrypt E2EE communications with the same safeguards requirements. That of course does not exclude the possibility of the Court finding that a more narrowly-construed law is not in violation. But the Court clearly signals its skepticism towards any "requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users" (para 79).

I think that depends on what you mean: a general state of emergency or a specific situation where the police deem there to be an emergency (e.g. classic hidden bomb scenario)

Regarding (2), the Court found that a statutory obligation to decrypt E2E-encrypted data upon (judicial) request to be disproportionate, but it could still be imagined that – if more narrowly construed – a law could be considered to be proportionate. But the Court does seem quite unwilling to entertain the idea of backdoors for E2E encryption.

Regarding (1), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) allows so-called derogations from certain rights in "time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation" (Art 15 ECHR), insofar as they are necessary and the state of emergency has been properly declared. The right to privacy is such a right, so a State that faces an insurgency may declare a state of emergency and, as part of its emergency measures, could probably demand the decryption of E2E communications if it's necessary to fight the insurgency (e.g. it's a guerilla group using an E2E messenger) - but hard to judge in the abstract.

Slightly misleading: The Court's judgments are legally binding upon the State members of the Council of Europe. However, it is true that there is no armed enforcement mechanism – something that most domestic courts lack too – and instead decisions are enforced and monitored by the Council of Ministers (the equivalent of the UN General Assembly). However, most of its decisions are complied with most of the time by most nations (safe for Russia and Turkey), frequently because domestic courts will abide by the Court's rulings to overturn laws through its own decisions.

Click on "details" and you can permalink

For a better understanding: The Court held (in the circumstances of this case) that a legal obligation to decrypt E2E communications is a disproportionate interference with the right to privacy. The law in question specifically obligated messengers such as Telegram to hand over communications alongside the "information necessary to decrypt electronic messages if they were encrypted".

To come to that conclusion, it referred to the wide-scale impact such a weakening of E2E through backdoors would have and referred to "calls for alternative 'solutions to decryption without weakening the protective mechanisms, both in legislation and through continuous technical evolution.'" Looking at the cited material, these include traditional policing, undercover operations, metadata analysis, international police cooperation, live forensics on seized devices, guessing or obtaining private keys held by parties to the communication, using vulnerabilities in the target’s software or sending an implant to targeted devices.

While a ruling on a specific case (and law), the Court seems quite skeptical towards any "requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users". If I were the UK government, I would be quite worried that the UK Online Safety Bill will be overturned by domestic courts (or the European Court) on the basis of this ruling.

(It should be noted that, although the backdooring of E2E was considered to go beyond how the right to privacy may legitimately be restricted, the right to privacy is a so-called derogable right, i.e. a government can, upon declaration of a state of emergency, derogate from the right insofar that is necessary to address an emergency "threatening the life of the nation" (Art 15 ECHR))

Relevant paragraphs are paras 76-80 here: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng/#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-230854...}

This is fantastic. If companies want to create AI models, they should license the content they use for the training data. As long as there are not sufficient legal protections and the EU/Congress do not act, tools like these can serve as a stopgap and maybe help increase pressure on policymakers

To add to what other commenters said: Your app sounds very interesting, but the use cases and use scenarios remain a bit unclear. Personally, I would love to be able to just try it without having to sign up. Right now, the copy leaves the user experience very much in the dark

> The interim report identifies the following principles that should guide the formation of new global AI governance institutions:

> - Inclusivity: all citizens, including those in the Global South, should be able to access and meaningfully use AI tools.

> - Public interest: governance should go beyond the do no harm principle and define a broader accountability framework for companies that build, deploy and control AI, as well as downstream users.

> - Centrality of data governance: AI governance cannot be divorced from the governance of data and the promotion of data commons.

> - Universal, networked and multistakeholder: AI governance should prioritize universal buy-in by countries and stakeholders. It should leverage existing institutions through a networked approach.

> - International Law: AI governance needs to be anchored in the UN Charter, International Human Rights Law, and the Sustainable Development Goals.

> The Body identified what some functions of AI governance should entail. Among others, they include, regularly assessing the state of AI and its trajectory, harmonizing standards, safety and risk management frameworks, promoting international multistakeholder collaboration to empower the Global South, monitoring risks and coordinating emergency response, and developing binding accountability norms.