Moodles
But what isn’t plausible is the part you left out that’s talked about in the video? That some people explain the Mandela effect through pseudoscientific bullshit like alternative timelines merging. You also seem to conflate the ridiculousness of what some people collectively remember with the Mandela effect concept as a whole. It’s a bit like saying hypnosis as an idea is dumb because people do dumb things when hypnotised? I also don’t understand what is deeply offensive about people misremembering that Mandela died in prison? They’re not saying (or even remembering) that he was a bad person, probably the opposite, they’re just ignorant of history.
But having said all that I am perplexed by the OP comment: “I can’t help but think the Mandela effect is an example”. An example of what? Cracks in spacetime? Because yeah that’s dumb, though probably a joke.
Chess GMs at Magnus and Hans’ level wouldn't even need to cheat on every move and certainly not on any opening where something like the first 20 best moves are all memorised. These guys would only need the engine to tell with them one or two moves per game to pretty much always win.
Why did Magnus start the game and then resign? Maybe he thought it would make a statement. Maybe he needed to technically show up to the game to avoid a penalty.
For myself, I’ve always associated colours with days of the week. I don’t know if others have this, but it’s always felt more “obvious” what colours some days of the week are compared to others, like the feeling is stronger or the colour is more brilliantly defined. But I do wonder to what extent it may have just been me as a child tricking myself into thinking I’m special, and I’ve just forever embedded those colour memories, because it’s really not like if someone tells me “Wednesday” I automatically experience a powerful crimson red; I have to kind of ask myself: “what colour is Wednesday?” to experience it in my mind’s eye.
I predict with some confidence this will be made into a CTF soon if it hasn't already so we may as well work on the code now ;-)
m_2 = c^d_q mod q
= m^(e * d_q) mod q
= m because?Could you just elaborate on the part:
> If m < q, m_2 = m and there is nothing left to add.
Why is this? What is d_p? d mod p?
> We're in the bizarre circumstance of being able to get our target to use a partially corrupted version of their own secret RSA key to decrypt a message of our choosing (this never happens! Only with Mega!).
We overwrite the ciphertext of q^{-1} so that is fully corrupted (or at least, because it is ECB mode, a block of it is corrupted), right? By partially corrupted, do you mean "p and q are fine, but q^{-1} is not what it is supposed to be"? Does it matter how we corrupt q^{-1}? Is it just a bit flip in a single block? Do we have to corrupt it the same every time to make a new guess for q?
> We set m, the plaintext message we get to choose, to the middle of the range of possible q's. Remember, q is smaller than m;
I'm not quite following this part. To clarify, are you saying (roughly, I know RSA has some checks that q is not outrageously small) q lies in the interval [0, 2^1024] and we, on our first guess, set m = (2^1024 - 0)/2 = 2^1023? Then the adversary encrypts this guess m using the public key N from the client. m, when decrypted by the client at this point, could clearly be either larger or smaller than q, right? Our choice for m is literally in the middle. But the client also pads the resulting m, so it will certainly be larger than q? But to clarify, q is only (almost certainly) smaller than m because of the padding that the client adds?
> * If m < q, the message is going to miss our faulted qInv
I'm confused again, sorry. Is this m without the padding, right? Why, if m < q, does the RSA calculation not wrap around the modulus? I'm a bit confused how it pulls out only 0s, but this is probably related to my confusion at the last paragraph. Is it that it's that only 0s, but rather a small number followed by a ton of padding of 0s?
> * If m >= q, our qInv fucks up the decryption; we decrypt (I assume) random gibberish
The whole reason we fault qInv is so this case screws up while the other doesn't, right? And so it doesn't really matter how we fault qInv each time? This case faults because the calculation wraps around the modulus? It would be good to see the actual calculation and why this is which I think is my main struggle right now.
Could someone explain how the math works to provide the oracle? In particular, the exact values the malicious server inserts as the encrypted sid and q^(-1), and why, if the guess for q is lower than the real q the plaintext sid the client sends back is 0, and why it’s not zero if the guess is higher?
Am I right in thinking the attacker simply randomly flips a bit in q^(-1)? Why do they need to do this? Do they flip different bits on different guesses? And then how do they encode their guess for q in the encrypted sid? And why, exactly does this provide an oracle? How does the subsequent lattice search need only half as many guesses as binary search? Finally, does this attack require the victim to actually type their password in 512 times?
The Qubit Game
Amazon signs massive rocket deal with 3 firms to launch internet satélites
To be fair to these companies, the reason they do passwords so terribly is because of such poor guidance and standards in the past. Even now NIST has SP 800-132 for guidance on generating a cryptographic key from a password for storage applications, which is different and often confused with guidance on storing passwords (which they don’t give advice for). There they say to use PBKDF. Also, compliance standards such as PCI don’t allow for modern storage like Argon2, so at best companies use something like bcrypt.
Correct. It's also the difference between theoretical security for infinite time vs security for something like 10^30 years. Is it really worth changing tried and tested algorithms and implementations already in place?