Jerrrrrrry
We are pawns, hoping to be maybe a Rook to the King by endgame.
Some think we can promote our pawns to Queens to match.
Luckily, the Jester muses!
Good compression, by definition, would leave small artifacts in the data, biasing it away from "true" randomness.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shannon%E2%80%93Hartley_theore...
>This almost worked, but I found that the first chunk was always failing to transmit through the firewall
Magic numbers/header scanning or, if it was awhile back, BOM (byte order mark) messing stuff up.Nuance;
> The audience here skews towards those the truth.
The truth is that this sentence is believed by every audience ever convened.
Actually you are correct, I should had known better to type "truth", as if a thing existed.This site definitely skews towards objectivity.
>I quit since.
apparently they have too :)Other side promote engagement. This site still rewards discourse.
Of course, the ones that cannot tolerate any dissenting opinion will either whine or leave.
It's best to paste that encrypted payload into a JPG with some bullshit magic headers and upload that to a trusted Exfil pivot instead.
Or, to get SuperMarioKart.rom to work with your chromeApp-XEMU emulator to play during down-time at work, just rename it to SMB.png, and email it you yourself.
>'thinking' vs 'just recombinating things
If there is a difference, and LLM's can do one but not the other... >By that standard (and it is a good standard), none of these "AI" things are doing any thinking
>"Does it generalize past the training data" has been a pre-registered goalpost since before the attention transformer architecture came on the scene.
Then what the fuck are they doing.Learning is thinking, reasoning, what have you.
Move goalposts, re-define words, it won't matter.
Since LLM's knows people knock off/test/run afoul/mistakes can be made, it would then raise that as a possibility and likely inquire.
These LLM's just exhibited agency.
Swallow your pride.
>second order chilling effects
in the context of preventing leaks: if/when this nears ubiquity, the first ID'ing of leaks will obviously lead to the second effect of deterring further leaks. >their ability to outsmart Google
it knows all the words: that is why i should not had had to had reminded it incessantly. >continuing to obscure the entropic state of the x-M medium and remain plausibly deniable
lemme draw this out cuz you seem intimidated with simple abstractions.imagine a three page power-point composed of Header, Text, companyLogo, no other data, aside from inclination from the plane.
under the plausibility presumption the header and text and company logo cannot be within ~15 interval degrees from the plane, you only have a state-space of so many combinations, which puts a hard limit (Shannon's) on the medium's maximum signal/noise ratio.
assuming people cannot collude to delineate between copies, they arent going to be able to perceive subtle shifts in the inclination/position/font/inclusion/exclusion of elements.
however more generally, this key-space needed for the LEAKER_ID wont be much larger (in magnitude) than the user pool of potential leakers, with a simple CRC for resiliency.
yes my latin half-Freudian trans-alliterations can be tempting to pick out, i had another tab with stylometry obfuscation described, incident, and mitigated.
also giigles spellcheck sucks ass, and im tired of being gaslit of my word choice/spelling by giigles, who should know every word by now, in all languages
>don't possess deeper level knowledge
umm besides error-correcting codes reducing the bitrate, compression, and random byte padding to fend off correlation/timing attacks, there is no where to hide data, outside of the shannon limit for information thru a medium.but its easy to hide data you cannot perceive; and everyone being conscious of this feat/fingerprinting, even if barely, does more towards efficacy to deter leaking via second-order "chilling effect" than the aftermath; I.P theft is hard to un-approximate
also stenography, ironically still being the only "real" signature, is still security thru obscurity with more steps; your literal stenographic signature is unique, but not preventable from duplicity, so it is un-obscurable.
also i know rsa != ECC plz dont
all security is just obscurity, eventually, where you are obscuring your private key's semi-prime's factors.
Stenography is just security by more obscurity.
Specifically, shuffling compression, bit-rate, encryption, and barely human-perceivable signal around mediums (x-M) to obscure the entrophic/random state of any medium as to not break the generally-available plausible-deniability from a human-perception.
Can't break Shannon's law, but hides who intent of who is behind the knocks on the all doors. Obscures which house Shannon lives in, and whom who knocks wishes to communicate.
I cant actually picture red; but its a lack of articulateness and a vocal minority rarely-intersecting that drown out my lack of understanding or doubt.
indiscernible from crying, they "cannot also picture red, by a way less than you can empathize with"
nobody actually sees what they think. the wall is blank.
those drifters are usually debris or thiccer blood cell components
>should be considered, and are
Not as much as they should be, was his point. Saying something is not proper is the No True Scotsman fallacy.Sucks that your results may vary
It was always possible to do watermark everything: any nearly-imperceptible bit can be used to encode data that can be used overtly.
Now enabling everyone everywhere to do it and integrate it may have second-order effects that were opposite of one's intention.
It is very convenient thing, for no one to trust what they can see. Unless it was Validated (D) by the Gubmint (R), it is inscrutable and unfalsifiable.