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DoH/DoT over Tor will provide stronger security and privacy guarantees across the board, but a well run .odns (anycast, good caches) could probably provide better performance.
The .odns anonymity is strictly weaker than DoH-over-Tor because the .odns operator can see which recursive resolver is in use, and not all such resolvers serve large enough audiences to provide strong anonymity.
The .odns requests are also very easy to identify, monitor and block, and it's likely that metadata (query size, timings) will still leak a fair bit of information, especially if correlated with other network activity.
I'm going to go out on a limb, and assert that THE most common attack performed against peoples' e-mail, is a jealous person who knows their partner's password logging on to their e-mail and reading their mail.
I know people who have done this. You probably do too.
People trust each other, people routinely tell their loved ones their passwords. And relationships routinely fall apart and trust is routinely violated.
Deleting from the server mitigates this problem and greatly reduces the window of opportunity for the attacker.
The privacy cost/benefit ratio for routinely deleting from the server probably beats every other privacy enhancing technique out there. Super simple, super effective.
Techies too often forget that privacy isn't just about the NSA, APTs and TLAs. The fact is, the people most interested in violating your privacy are the people who know you personally...
I'd hesitate to implement it though, because of secondary risks. It would need to be thought through very carefully, and there are a whole bunch of abuse scenarios that would need to be avoided or mitigated.
As a rule, Mailpile does very little when it receives a mail - until the user has interacted with it, we have to assume the mail is junk and/or potentially hostile.
See the chapter on Oracles here: https://research.checkpoint.com/cryptographic-attacks-a-guid... - automatically triggering sender-controlled network access based on the contents of e-mail opens the door for such things.
This applies not only to cryptographic attacks, but also to more pedestrian exploitation of bugs in the app itself, or silly things like turning Mailpiles into DDoS attack robots.
That's not nothing. :-)
But you're right there are trade-offs. If you don't have good backups, you are indeed increasing the odds of data loss by managing the data yourself. That is also true of encryption of data at rest, you are increasing the odds of data loss to buy some protection against unauthorized access. There are always trade-offs.
I had grand visions for how Mailpile could help mitigate such issues by encrypting the mail and re-uploading back to an IMAP server. But I haven't gotten that written, so for now it's just an idea. Someday, I hope.
Disclaimer: I wrote Mailpile. :-D
In pay-for-click, advertisers are paying for advertising which is effective. The click is how that is measured.
There are other ways to measure effectiveness, but measuring clicks is simple and reliable. No matter how you do it, advertisers ultimately want to pay for ads that work and lead to sales.
Everything else is a means to an end, targeting in particular. Ineffective advertising is a worthless waste of money, no matter how well targeted it is. Untargeted advertising which leads to sales on the other hand, is very valuable.
So sure, advertisers will prefer targeted advertising. But that's because they expect it will work better than the alternative. What matters to them is whether it works, not how.
To the general public the how is critical though. If there was less tracking and spying and data harvesting we'd all be better off. So it's very important to squash the misunderstanding that tracking and targeting itself has intrinsic value for anyone. For society (and for the ad networks), tracking has a significant cost and is in many ways a significant liability. For advertisers it's a tool in their toolbox, and if we could replace it with a more benign one, that'd be good for everyone.
I don't think it's a stretch to assert that users that engage with and click on ads are much more valuable to Google than users that don't.
Whether the users that do neither contribute positively or negatively to the bottom line is an interesting question. I suspect they're a net negative, but obviously you disagree.
Google themselves probably know the answer, but I doubt they're telling...
Aside: a supporting data-point for my gut feeling here is that AdSense has always contributed much, much less to Google's revenue than AdWords does. The difference between the two gives a clear indication of how capturing user intent (searching for products) completely dominates how valuable (=effective) the ads are, and is much more important than all the other tracking combined. Google could probably turn off all the tracking and still make tons of money. Some numbers are here: http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/020515/busine...
Advertisers quite literally pay for clicks. That was part of how Google disrupted the market back in the day; most other advertising networks were selling "impressions", but Google was so confident in the relevance of their ads that you got impressions for free and only paid when a customer actually clicked on it.
The click is worth paying for, because it is a signal that the user has seen the ad, thought about the ad, and is interested in the ad. Advertising gold.
Obviously Google have many products (they bought Doubleclick an "impressions" company), and there are analytics value-ads and all sorts of things. But the core of their business is still pay-per-click advertising.
Your idea that advertisers are buying raw data is a misunderstanding.
Consider that Google actually became super profitable well before all the detailed tracking started. You grossly underestimate the synergy of "people searching for products" and "displaying ads". Everything else is an optimization.
You're describing Facebook... which is no where near as profitable as Google, in spite of much more invasive tracking.
If you never click an ad and use an adblocker so you never even see them, your traffic and your data just cost Google money. They may be able to extract some small amount of value by observing your behaviour and using those insights to improve their products, but they don't make any money until someone pays for an ad.
I agree the café analogy isn't perfect. I was just pointing out that outsiders who don't understand what's going on may fundamentally misunderstand the transaction. You can still provide value to the café by sitting in their chairs if you liven up the place and give them feedback on how to make the place nicer.
But if customers never buy anything, the café goes broke. And people stop interacting with ads on Google, Google does too.
Consumers "pay" for Google's services by giving ads attention so the ads have value and Google can sell them.
All the data harvesting is a means to a end: to make the ads more appealing so you'll click. Google don't profit from the data directly; in fact all the data harvesting and processing is a significant cost factor. There are certainly other businesses that resell data and profit directly from data harvesting, but AFAIK, Google is not really one of them.
It's a bit like saying that you pay a café by letting them observe you while you sit in their chairs. A basic misunderstanding of what's actually going on.
I would not put it past Facebook (or other businesses which are addicted to harvesting user data) to behave badly against networks like this. However, for the sake of their reputations they'd still probably do it quietly, which means many of the person-to-person attacks that deletion protects against would still be thwarted.
This is a problem the same way Facebook's privacy controls are a problem. Facebook themselves are not bound by them, but they're still useful if you want to protect your data from other users of the platform.
And FWIW, I think most of the big crawlers respect robots.txt - this is the same sort of thing.
Only bad actors will disobey and they will have to modify their software in order to do so. This doesn't provide absolute protection against bad actors, but since most bad actors don't own a time machine, it reduces the scope of the harm they can enact.
Consider the adversary "angry ex-boyfriend." Let's assume he wasn't always angry and isn't a sociopath. By the time he has become angry, the sensitive posts have already been deleted. This makes a difference in real life to real people.
There is indeed a user-interface concern, to not over-promise to the end-user. But that doesn't justify leaving such a useful thing out at the protocol level.
Sure, the hunk of rock we call a planet will go on, and life will go on, but claiming we are the only casualty here is profoundly wrong.
Broad experience, depth on a few topics. It's not impossible at all, it just takes time.
(edit: Note this may have changed since I left the company in 2009. It's been a while!)
"Rock stars" are downright dangerous, as are people who prefer to make things up rather than admit ignorance.
A new SRE doesn't need to know everything (and can't). But he absolutely needs to be curious and willing to ask for help.
Note I said research: I do not consider the current crop of secure messaging protocols to be viable alternatives to e-mail, as they all suffer from extreme centralization. Allowing unicorns to own and monopolize global infrastructure may appeal to silicon valley insiders, but it's not something the rest of us should be promoting.
The E2E promise was that with Google's backing, suddenly millions of people would/could encrypt and PGP would take a big step forward, making some forced upgrades in the rest of the community worthwhile. That is seeming less likely to happen now.
https://github.com/e2email-org/e2email/commit/434f99c66efe49...
Hopefully there's more to come! :-P
HN submission: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13728327
(Genuinely hoping someone will find the good news I'm missing here)
E2EMail is not a Google product, it’s now a fully community-driven open source project, to which passionate security engineers from across the industry have already contributed.
Contrast that with their Github repo, which has seen no commits since August, as well as pull requests and issues that nobody has responded to.
I would dearly love to be proven wrong; if there has been ongoing work from "passionate security engineers" somewhere else and I'm just missing it, hopefully someone can post some details here?
(edit: Disclosure, I work on Mailpile, which is arguably a "competitor" to both e2e and GMail. But I did genuinely want to see this project succeed and improve e-mail security.)
I'm not in the Valley, so all the information I have about Uber's culture is through popular media, but ever since I first heart the company's name it was linked to scandal, poor ethics and/or misogyny.
Talented software developers are a privileged bunch, especially on the West Coast U.S. we are sought after and can pick and choose employers. Why would anyone choose Uber, especially a talented woman?
Do SW devs just not realize how much power and choice they have? Or do people really just choose to work for unethical businesses because they expect a good paycheck? If it's the latter, what does that say about their own personal ethics?
To be clear, I don't honestly believe the majority of Uber's staff are bad people. But that leaves me genuinely baffled as to what they are doing there in the first place.
I remember when I was in university students were acutely aware that tools like PhotoShop, Microsoft* and MATLAB were used in businesses. I doubt this has changed.
Even if superior Free options had been available, many of them would still have opted for the "safe" proprietary options because they wanted to be sure they could get work and felt (rightly or wrongly) that it was important they could put the right product names on their resumés.
But I do know people that do that sort of work, and I also know that when I went looking for a code of conduct for my own project, I found lots of pre-existing material to work with.
You guys are making this out to be a lot harder and more complicated than it actually is.