FluGameAce007
Unsigned requests are sent directly to Apple APIs. No fallback, no integrity checks. Replay and downgrade attacks are possible.
Includes syslog evidence + PoC sketch: https://github.com/JGoyd/ams-failopen
Not theoretical — this was observed live in the wild.
It's that a production device entered a state where normally fused-off debug logic became accessible. That shouldn’t be possible, regardless of how the logs were captured or named.
Think: stolen phones, shady repair shops, or border checks — cases where physical access + this flaw = real risk.
That’s why a hardware recall may be necessary... fuses are meant to be irreversible. If they fail, there's no patch.
Worse, the system prunes logs aggressively, erasing the very diagnostic history that could expose this behavior. So not only is debug logic unintentionally enabled, the evidence is self-erasing.
The flaw is triggered by abrupt power loss (e.g. during brownouts or unstable charging), preventing the secure world and logging subsystems from initializing. Confirmed it on real A17 Pro device.
Curious if others can reproduce this, or if similar behavior exists in M-series chips.
This violates Apple’s hardware trust model and exposes internal diagnostics meant for development silicon.
Sequence of events:
tccd preflights access to Reminders (TCC-protected) with no app context
abm-helper, CommCenterRootHelper, and cfprefsd coordinate via Mach/XPC
sosd attempts to write to a sensitive communications safety plist
nsurlsessiond purges its cache
symptomsd logs 5MB+ of RX/TX traffic — with no app running
There is:
No telemetry toggle
No EDR/MDM visibility
No disclosure from Apple
This breaks the app-based sandbox and represents:
A system-native stealth exfil pipeline
Cross-daemon privilege chaining
A real privacy and compliance blind spot
The fact that internal system daemons can silently trigger access to TCC-protected domains (like Contacts, FaceID, Microphone, and Bluetooth) without app association or user consent breaks Apple’s own stated privacy model.
iOS 18.5 Bluetooth Privacy Vulnerabilities
System daemons silently initiate Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) scans without app activity or user interaction.
GPS location harvesting occurs with no prompts, indicators, or active apps.
Internal frameworks bypass Apple’s Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) protections using undocumented flags.
Bluetooth trust metadata (e.g., IRKs, pairing history) is exposed even when devices are disconnected.
Cryptographic failures are silently ignored during trust operations.
These behaviors suggest an integrated telemetry pipeline that operates beneath iOS’s user-facing privacy model. The full report includes logs, technical breakdowns, and reproduction steps.
Full details are in the post, along with raw footage and a downloadable report. I'm open to technical discussion and critique.
Apple's Bluetooth trust persists after cryptographic failure (iOS 18.5)
iOS 1-Click Crypto Theft: Apple Fixed It, Google Shared It, Researcher Left Out
AudioConverterService – memory corruption, AppleBCMWLAN.dext – kernel-level escalation, CryptoTokenKit – silent ECDSA key exfiltration enabling crypto theft.
Despite submitting the report to Apple (ID OE19648805943313), I received no acknowledgment or credit. On April 11, 2025, I forwarded the same working exploit to Google. Days later, Apple patched the issue under CVE-2025-31200, with credit going to Google—not the original researcher.
The linked post documents the full timeline, attack chain, and its potential connection to real-world crypto theft. I am posting for transparency to users.