Unless, of course, you have a closed system everyone cooperates in; which is nothing like current email and cannot be rolled on gradually.
Honestly now? That list hurts because it's true, and you know it. You cannot wipe out spam without losing the decentralization element built into current protocols. Your "solution" would just add yet another "signal" to the long list of hacks spammers routinely implement.
(Not that I really care: I use gmail, trading my privacy for some of the best antispam systems money can buy, and I'm happy enough. I'm just a bit too old to still believe spam can be fixed, or that "webs of trust" can work at significant scale.)
I was writing about NNTP, not SMTP—they are different.
> You cannot wipe out spam without losing the decentralization element built into current protocols.
NNTP was never decentralised like SMTP is. Each NNTP site had a very limited number of feeds, set up on a social basis. There was no concept that anyone could submit articles anywhere; rather, users submitted articles to their local site, which forwarded them on. In this environment, cutting bad feeds out would have worked (or at least, kept spam to a manageable level, which is all anyone really cares about).
Also, the biggest problem with PGP-type signing as a mechanism to control spam is not whether you can spoof the signature or not, it's that there's nothing in it that stops the spammer from generating a new identity once the current identity is tarnished.
In addition to that you failed to understand what signatures do: there is no way you can have sign a message with anybody else signature. And it doesn't require immediate cooperation if a signed message with a good reputation is used as one of several spam signals. You want to discuss viagra? Well better sign your message with a public key and have a track record of not being a spammer.
Blacklists are the de facto solution that we implemented because using that list prevented any consensus of any other method of combating spam.